In the immediate aftermath of the terror attacks in Mumbai, India, there is little doubt that there will be pressure on the incoming Obama Administration to move quickly in response to the Pakistan-India (and Afghanistan) security crisis. Early reports suggest that Pakistani based militants are behind the Mumbai violence and that American leadership will be necessary in order to secure regional stability.

While a focus on the region in general and Pakistan in particular is welcome, it is critically important that the new Administration develops a nuanced, long term approach to the very real challenges that exist. Crucially, the Administration must sequence its response and remember that despite the violence in Mumbai, and the link to Kashmir, it is stability in Pakistan that is a crucial first step to bringing peace to South Asia. This will take time and a clear understanding of how militancy has grown in Pakistan over recent years.

Most analysts believe that the Bush Administration’s support for the government of Gen. Musharraf contributed to a systematic rise in militancy over the last few years. Musharraf sought to marginalize and ban popular liberal opposition parties while allowing fringe religious parties to fill the vacuum; he assumed that he could control these parties and their figures. In reality, the religious parties became the primary outlet for anti-Musharraf sentiment and some of them fueled a rise in militancy. Policy analysts who recognized that Pakistani spikes in militancy occurred when the country was ruled by the military accurately predicted that history would repeat itself under Musharraf. The situation is most grave in the hard-to-govern tribal areas that border Afghanistan where a historic mistrust of central government, a rise in militancy and the relocated Taliban and Al Qaeda have created a security crisis.

Understanding what has happened in Pakistan over the last few years is vitally important because there is a risk that the wrong lessons are permeating conventional wisdom in Washington, DC. Some U.S. intelligence advisors have recently inferred that the U.S. has increased reason to worry about Pakistan now that a weak democratic government has displaced their ally, Musharraf. These analysts imply that there is an increased risk of a fundamentalist takeover now in comparison to when the pro-American strongman ruled. If the Mumbai attackers are drawn from Pakistan it will bolster this view. However, such thinking is dangerously off base and displays a fundamental misunderstanding of the situation; U.S. interests are served, not harmed, if the Pakistani democratic process works and democratic control of government is maintained.

Illustratively, in the elections that saw the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) form the government, the religious parties were routed in the tribal North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Awami National Party (ANP), a secular Pushtun-nationalist party won in that region and has partnered with the PPP. When Musharraf was in power he rigged the elections and religious parties won in areas like NWFP; in this case, without government interference, a non-religious party won.

Despite the positive results of the recent elections, there is much work that needs to be accomplished in Pakistan. The tribal areas in particular will appropriately be the focus of the next Administrations Pakistan policy. The U.S. must recognize that there are at least two distinct groups of locals in this area. One small group will never support the Pakistani central government and will oppose its collaboration with the U.S – they are allied to Al Qaeda and will use violence to push their agenda. This group needs to be dealt with by the Pakistani military as an instrument of the democratic government. The second group is the silent majority; they will determine whether the Pakistani government and the U.S. or militants supporting Al Qaeda will ultimately win in the tribal areas. This group requires aid, development assistance, stability, an alternative to madrassas and security. They need a combination of a “Marshall Plan”, a small U.S. security footprint (that drastically reduces the use of the drones that have killed many civilians) and U.S.-Pakistani efforts to turn their leaders away from Al Qaeda and to support them when they do so.

Such an approach should yield positive change in the tribal region and in turn foster a strengthening of democracy across the country. As Pakistan becomes a more stable democracy, the Obama government should look to tackle long-term regional challenges such as the India-Kashmir issue. The success of such an initiative will increase if stable democratic governments govern both partners, India and Pakistan.

For now, the Pakistani security situation requires a sustained and nuanced U.S. approach that emphasizes support for the democratic government and democratic institutions, economic support for the central government, a Marshall Plan for the tribal areas and a recalibrated approach to security strategy in that area.