In favor of a little gray
Commentators and politicians have drawn a variety of conclusions from the recent conflict between Georgia and Russia. Most of them have strongly condemned Russia’s actions, as they rightfully should. However, I believe that there is a lesson to be learned that has not received sufficient attention.
Our foreign policy has recently placed an overemphasis on the perceived benevolence, goodwill, or support of particular leaders and has failed to sufficiently take into account the self-serving motivations of those leaders and the broader environment in which they operate. The current administration has also tended to present foreign policy issues in simple black and white terms. This focus on individual leaders and portraying them simplistically as “good guys” and “bad guys” has not served us well.
Of course, President Bush’s special relationship with Vladimir Putin continues to be the source of much dismay among many commentators and fodder for many comedians’ jokes. Describing Putin back in 2001 Bush said, “I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straight forward and trustworthy and we had a very good dialogue….I was able to get a sense of his soul.” Of course, that was well before Putin’s authoritarian crack down on the media, human right abuses, and Russia’s recent attack on Georgia. I wonder what Bush actually saw in his soul. This pattern of placing our faith in questionable foreign leaders extends to those such as the soon to be impeached President Musharraf of Pakistan or President Karimov of Uzbekistan. Bush told the world, “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.” Those who were with us were the “good guys.”
So, if Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin are now the “bad guys” according to John McCain, then, according to the way that the current administration has approached foreign policy, Georgian President Saakashvili must be the good guy, right? It’s not that simple. Freedom House currently ranks Georgia as “partly free”. Although the country held elections in 2004 that were received positively by observers, recent crack downs by Saakashvili on thousands of government protesters, and the imposition of a state of emergency during last November’s protests, lead one to question the democratic environment in Georgia.
In a recent op-ed in the Washington Post, nobel peace prize winner Mikhail Gorbachev criticized Saakashvili for launching attacks on the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali that led to the Russian invasion. Of course, Gorbachev is far from a neutral observer. However, we must not forget that from the Russian point of view, they were reacting to Georgian aggression towards the breakaway enclave that is closely linked with Russia. I don’t present this point of view as justified or correct. It’s clear that this debate could easily degenerate into a school yard yelling match about “who started it”. Nevertheless, each side has its own point of view and is convinced that they were just reacting to the other side’s unjustified aggression.
Saakashvili was certainly wrong to attack South Ossetia. It seems that he had expected a greater outpouring of support from the international community that would back him up. The Russians then trumped this mistake by dramatically overreacting, seeing this as an opportunity to flex their muscle. What’s clear is that in this conflict both sides have some culpability. Whether one is more culpable than the other depends on where you sit.
Without question, the U.S. and the international community should insist that Russians and Georgians abide by the recently agreed upon cease-fire and return to their positions before the conflict. So far, reports on Russia’s lack of compliance are quite alarming. Maximum pressure must be placed on Russia to abide by that agreement. Using the WTO and G8 membership levers should be considered.
What would be a dramatic mistake would be for the U.S. and the international community to view this conflict in black and white terms, similar to the hard line laid down by John McCain. It’s time to move away from analyses that seek to simplify complex situations into good guys and bad guys. It’s time that we moved away from black and white distinctions, in favor of a little gray.
No related posts.
Black and white are scary when imperfect leaders define them for us. Black and white are not scary after thoughtful consideration that includes empathizing with the different world views in question.
Gray, on the other hand, is always scary, and always dangerous. Gray implies that there is no best answer; that ethnic cleansing or corrupt government or collateral damage isn’t right or wrong, but just “more complicated.” Gray allows us to throw up our hands and turn our attention toward tonight’s Olympic broadcast or this weekend’s shopping trip.
The answer to the problem you eloquently describe isn’t “grayifying” our responsibility for moral judgment: after all, it was either right or wrong to break the ceasefire or to attack South Ossetia, and the world needs to do something about it as a result. The answer to the problem is to dig in, to ask questions, to learn more, to watch Jim Lehrer instead of Bob Costas tonight and to visit a Brookings panel instead of a Banana Republic this weekend.
And then, refreshed and informed, to return to black and white.
Comment on August 14, 2008 @ 12:11 pm
Noah,
I agree that there are situations that the answer is much clearer cut. In my mind, Darfur, Zimbabwe, and Burma are a few examples. Some may disagree. If we concede that foreign policy issues are difficult and complicated, it does not require that we throw up our hands and give up. Rather, it requires that we look at each situation from a variety of vantage points. After doing that, we come to a conclusion. My conclusion in the case of Georgia, is that both sides have some culpability. In the case of Georgia, both actions: the attack on South Ossetia by the Georgians and the response by the Russians were wrong. My point is that it would be a mistake to try to fit this situation into a simplistic good vs bad paradigm.
Comment on August 14, 2008 @ 9:24 pm
A Middle Ground between Realpolitik and Neo-containment
I am a Russian citizen myself, and an opponent of the current Putin’s regime and its policies, but more importnatly I feel myself a global citizen and therefore in my post I will try to look at the issue not only in terms of the relations between the US and Russia, but also beyond that.
To start with, I believe that the very rhetoric of “spheres of influence” and “backyards” is a thing of the past not much suitable for a 21st century world. Robert Kagan rightly noticed that the current Russian leadership views the world in terms of 19th century Realpolitik, but why should the US start speaking with Russia in the same outdated language? If Realpolitik becomes the accepted language of relationship between the US and Russia, it will be a step back from even the current imperfect architecture of the international relations, where narrowly defined national interests and ambitions do not always determine policy outcomes, despite the realists’ claim to the contrary. Even the collapse of the global order (similar to the one in 1914) may become a reality, as is well argued by Paul Krugman in his recent op-ed in IHT (see http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/08/15/opinion/edkrugman.php).
More specifically, the “spheres of influence” concession (or a bone if you will) to Russia will not make the countries in the Russian near abroad willing to bow easily to Russian pressure. It will, however, as in case with isolating Russia, threaten further dividing EU and NATO. It may also unnecessarily embolden Russia and other Realpolitik states such as China or Iran to continue or even step up irresponsible behavior in their “spheres of influence”.
That said, I am also not a fan of neo-containment of Russia and other Realpolitik states, if neo-containment means some sort of isolation. First of all, as in case of playing by their rules, containing them will almost certainly fuel the Realpolitik (or even expansionist) mentality of the leadership of such states, not only through a cause-effect mechanism, but also through internal dynamics of such states. If you watch the hysteria in Kremlin controlled media in Russia these days or remember the massive outpour of Chinese nationalism in response to the Tibet criticism, you will see that the internal dimension of conflicts with the West is perhaps even more important than the external posture per se. Russian officials did not bother very much to convey their message or explain their position to the West but were very surprised when their saber-rattling aimed primarily at the Russian audience raised such an alarm in the western media. This very saber-rattling and relentless propaganda, however, have led to a sort of rally-round-the-flag effect which may have serious ramifications for any prospect of liberalization in Russia. The last thing the US would want is to strengthen the authoritarian regime in Russia by fueling the besieged fortress mentality.
The supporters of containment may argue that Russia has a stake in the current world institutional order and may be contained by a threat of exclusion from G8 or Russia-NATO Council or rejection of WTO membership. Russia is indeed interested in membership in these institutions. It also does not want to be viewed as an agressor or a bully (hence its insistence on the humanitarian nature of the military operation in Georgia).
However, the Russian stake in the international institutional order is still too limited to make Russia a responsible stakeholder exercising sufficient restraint in its actions. Thus, the urgent imperative is to think how to increase, rather than decrease that stake.
Is There a Middle Ground?
The seemingly simple conclusion that follows from the above is that the US and the West should find some middle ground between Realpolitik concessions and containment in relation to Russia which is easy only at first sight.
My short-term vision of such middle ground is that the US and its allies should not institutionally isolate Russia, at least unless Russia fails to end its military presence in Georgia outside South Ossetia proper soon.
It would be ideal if the US changed its controversial missile defense decision and relocated its missile defense systems from Poland to, say, Israel or Turkey in a sign of good will and in return for Russian cooperation on Iran and commitment to fully withdraw from Georgia.
However, the US should not concede on the issue of NATO membership for the Ukraine and Georgia which is much more important and not shadowed with controversy unlike the missile defense issue. This will deny Russia the Realpolitik clout and will perhaps make it think twice before interfering with the Georgian or Ukrainian affairs on such a scale. However, NATO membership for Georgia should not be a green light for its leadership to do whatever they want to reclaim Abkhasia and South Ossetia against their will, which NATO members should clearly articulate to the Georgian leadership.
Comment on August 19, 2008 @ 10:31 am