When it comes to Iraq Sen. John McCain might as well be the Rev. Jesse Jackson. Every time he speaks on the subject it is a sound bite variation on “keep hope alive.” The U.S. strategy is working, the surge is successful. Every day, in every way, things keep getting better and better. 

Of course, McCain acknowledges that things weren’t always this way. His campaign website says:

At the end of 2006, four years of a badly conceived military strategy that concentrated American troops on large bases brought us near to the point of no return. Sectarian violence in Iraq was spiraling out of control. Al Qaeda in Iraq was on the offensive. Entire provinces were under extremists’ control and were deemed all but lost. At that critical moment, John McCain supported sending reinforcements to Iraq to implement a classic counterinsurgency strategy of securing the population. 

But that was then, this is now.

From June 2007 through March 2008, sectarian and ethnic violence in Iraq was reduced by 90 percent. Civilian deaths and deaths of coalition forces fell by 70 percent…

Thanks to the success of the surge, Iraq’s political order is evolving in positive and hopeful ways. Four out of the six laws cited as benchmarks by the U.S. have been passed by the Iraqi legislature. A law on amnesty and a law rolling back some of the harsher restrictions against former employees of the Iraqi government have made it possible for Iraqis to move toward genuine reconciliation. The legislature has devolved greater power to local and provincial authorities, where much of the real work of rebuilding Iraq is taking place. 

Well, who could be unhappy about that?  Nobody, if that is the entire story. But, as his website goes on to say, “It is essential to be honest with the American people about the opportunities and risks that lie ahead. The American people deserve the truth from their leaders. They deserve a candid assessment of the progress made in the last year, of the serious difficulties that remain.” 

In that regard let’s take a look at a U.S. Government Accountability Office report that came out last month.

First, the good news. The report, “SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ” confirms, as Sen. McCain writes that overall violence, as measured by enemy-initiated attacks, fell about 70 percent in Iraq, from about 180 attacks per day in June 2007 to about 50 attacks per day in February 2008. 

But it also notes that security gains have largely resulted from (1) the increase in U.S. combat forces, (2) the creation of nongovernmental security forces such as Sons of Iraq, and (3) the Mahdi Army’s declaration of a cease fire. 

Only the first of these factors is clearly attributable to the new U.S. strategy. The Sons of Iraq movement was something the Iraqis created themselves, although the U.S was smart enough to encourage it. Interestingly the report notes that most Sons of Iraq members work on MNF-I contracts. In essence they are private security contractors. 

And the ceasefire is dependent on Motaqua al-Sadr. Whether it holds is up to him, not the United States. 

The report also notes that data for March 2008 show an increase in violence in Iraq. Security conditions deteriorated in March 2008, with the average number of attacks increasing from about 50 per day in February 2008 to about 70 attacks per day in March—about a 40 percent increase. 

And despite improvements in the security situation, an April 2008 UN report found that violence has continued throughout Iraq and could rapidly escalate. According to the UN, toward the end of 2007, suicide bombings, car bombs, and other attacks continued with devastating consequences for civilians. While security improved in Baghdad and other locations, it deteriorated elsewhere, including in the city of Mosul in Ninewa province and in Diyala province. 

The report also noted that between 2005 and 2007, Iraq spent only 24 percent of the $27 billion it budgeted for its own reconstruction efforts. More specifically, Iraq’s central ministries, responsible for security and essential services, spent only 11 percent of their capital investment budgets in 2007—down from similarly low rates of 14 and 13 percent in the 2 prior years. Violence and sectarian strife, shortage of skilled labor, and weak procurement and budgeting systems have hampered Iraq’s efforts to spend its capital budgets. 

Problems like this will persist regardless of how many U.S. troops remain. So it would be wise for McCain, Obama, and anyone else interested in Iraq to stop having irrelevant debates over the surge and start looking forward to the real problems Iraq must deal with if we really want to bring about the unified, democratic federal Iraq that the United States says it wants. 

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