Arms Control Part II: Effectiveness Through Independence
I’m going to pick up on one part of the discussion of organizing for arms control and non-proliferation that my colleague Andy Semmel mentioned in his own piece on this blog as well as in his Senate testimony on May 15: the creation (or recreation) of a separate agency for arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and related objectives. In my view, those functions have not been adequately performed within the State Department, and a new (or rather restored) independent agency is needed to reinvigorate US arms control and non-proliferation policy. That agency should have the particular goal of restoring our commitment to international rules and treaties as the underpinning of global collective security.
Let me also note that I share Andy’s view that controlling the spread of WMD is, or should be, a bipartisan national priority. To that end, it should be a shared objective among Democrats and Republicans to improve the way we organize our arms control and nonproliferation efforts. I hope that beginning with these two different but not incompatible views on the subject, we can foster a productive bipartisan dialogue, and agreement at least as to best practices, if not on the precise shape of our future arms control and non-proliferation programs.challenge as well.
On April 1, 1999, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), a mainstay of United States national security policy since 1961, went out of business. As part of a reorganization of foreign affairs agencies in 1998, the main functions of ACDA were absorbed by the State Department (Again, Andy describes the bureaus into which ACDA’s functions were absorbed).
Was this a wise decision? Are America and the world safer with the arms control portfolio integrated into the range of foreign policy concerns that occupy State rather than constituting the sole responsibility of a specialized agency?
President Kennedy and his Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, strongly supported the legislation that established ACDA. The fundamental rationale for not placing the arms control/non-proliferation bureaucratic structure within The State Department structure was, and is, that the pursuit of arms control and disarmament goals will often conflict with the primary mission of the Department of State, which is to foster good relations with other countries. For example, to press Pakistan on nuclear non-proliferation issues or criticize Russia for perceived arms control treaty violations can be contrary to pursuing improved relations with those countries and will often be opposed by the regional State Department bureau responsible for relations with the country in question. Most often, in the competition of ideas within State, interests of improved short-term bilateral relations will prevail over arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation interests.
The early years of the agency in the 1960s were prosperous and successful, as Secretary Rusk believed in and supported the role of ACDA. Over strong opposition by State, ACDA successfully pressed for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is now considered a centerpiece of international security. Other highlights, all of which depended on the existence of an independent arms control agency, were: negotiation of the SALT agreements; the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention; the extension of the nuclear weapon test moratorium in 1993, the indefinite extension of the NPT, and the negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
However, in the 1990’s the Department of State pressed for the termination of the ACDA and the merger of its functions into the Department of State. While this effort failed in the early 1990’s, it succeeded later in the decade with the support of the new Republican-led Congress in place after 1994. However this step was taken pursuant to a compromise solution agreed to by ACDA and State, supported by the White House and the Congress. This compromise solution, reached in 1998, contained certain conditions which if not observed in the future would remove the legitimacy of this new bureaucratic and legislative arrangement. These were principally the preservation of the independent arms control advocacy role within the government at the highest levels and that the ACDA arms control/non-proliferation functions transferred would be strengthened and have the lead role in the Executive Branch.
The conditions of this compromise were not met. The Bush administration chose not to appoint officials who were committed to the success of arms control/non-proliferation policies and not to observe the conditions of the 1998 decision. Rather, the arms control process was destroyed by: the abrogation of the ABM Treaty by the United States, the abandonment of the START process initiated by President Reagan and many other comparable actions which resulted in the grave weakening of the NPT. On top of all this, Secretary Rice essentially abolished the arms control bureau and restructured the non-proliferation bureau in State so as to make it much more difficult to develop and follow non-proliferation policies.
It is of the highest priority that the United States return to its traditional role of pursuing a world order built on rules and international treaties designed to enlarge international security and lead the world to a safer and more stable future. Only with a workable bureaucratic structure in place to support sound arms control/non-proliferation policies and agreements can this be accomplished.
The structure built on the 1998 compromise has demonstrated that it cannot work. The soundest solution would be for Congress to re-establish by statue an independent arms control agency. In that way, the independent voice for arms and control/ non-proliferation can best be preserved and even if there should be an attempt in the future to marginalize the arms control/non-proliferation process, with an independent agency in place it can always be bought back by a subsequent administration. Or if the establishment of an independent agency proves to be politically impossible, at a minimum the Congress should require by law observation of the conditions agreed as part of the 1998 compromise solution.
Ambassador Graham is the Chairman and co-founder of the Cypress Fund for Peace and Security. He has served as a senior U.S. diplomat involved in the negotiation of every major international arms control and non-proliferation agreement for the past 30 years, including The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) Treaties, The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaties, The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). His full bio is available here:
http://www.cypressfund.org/pages/organization.html
Related posts:
Having lived some of the debates over ACDA’s unique contribution to US national security and been part of the termporarily successful effort to prevent its elimination in the early 1990s (working for Amb. Graham), I can’t resist a chance to weigh in on this fascinating issue. Tom and Andy have both made important points. My view is that structure must serve policy — an organization dedicated to a mission at odds with administration priorities will not be effective and will not attract high quality talent, no matter what its founding mandate says. On the other hand, if arms control and nonproliferation are high prioirities, the selection of senior officials who are prepared to implement that priority will empower staff and open new possibilities for US policy and programs. I also tend to think that, because of the time lost in reorganizations to distraction and introspection, any decision to reorganize bears a high burden of proof that it’s worthwhile.
Andy raises the very important issue of career paths and how foreign service officers and civil service personnel are rewarded and groomed for leadership in the State Department. If these personnel and staffing policies are at odds with achieving desired policy outcomes, they need to be adjusted, but this ship will take time to turn. If such policies are so ingrained in the culture of the State Department that they cannot be changed, that may be a good reason to create a new organization. Another consequence of the last 10 years of mergers among the nonproliferation and arms control structures is the loss of authorized federal positions and management opportunities. If staff and management are spread too thin, they won’t be effective, and if there are minimal opportunities for promotion within a specialized area of knowledge, the staff will stagnate and shrink. The fact that so many talented federal employees have stuck with these missions and offices even in the face of limited opportunities for advancement speaks highly of their dedication, but we rely on future staff to share this commitment at our peril unless we change the reward structure.
A question that is only tangentially referenced in Andy’s and Tom’s comments is the relationship between the arms control/nonpro structures — whether independent or not — and how the NSC operates, which can either compensate for imperfect structure, or contradict ideal structure. Many of us have been arguing for a more focused NSC position embodied as a Deputy National Security Advisor dedicated to WMD issues. It would be interesting to consider what such a position might mean for effective organization of the arms control/nonrpoliferation/threat reduction mission in the agencies.
Comment on June 10, 2008 @ 1:31 pm
Ms Holgate raises some significant points on this important subject. And her viewpoint is especially valuable since she was very much part of the temporarily (for four years) successful effort to save an independent ACDA in 1993.
As I have said, I believe it unlikely that the United States will be able to successfully take the steps in the arms control/nonproliferation area that we must to safeguard American and world security unless the bureaucratic structure and personnel are in place to carry out the relevant policies. However, Laura correctly says that structure must serve policy and a President and Secretary of State committed to sound arms/nonproliferation policies would certainly make a difference even under the current structure.
Nevertheless, it is the genius of the American government to recognize that too much power located in one place, even with the best of intentions, is bad and that some institutions have to be protected from themselves. The central mission of the Department of State is to maintain and strengthen bi-lateral and multi-lateral relations with other countries. Often efforts, for example, to limit armaments, bring up cases of violations of arms control treaties and inhibit countries from acquiring nuclear weapons run directly counter to this central mission of the State Department and the requirements to carry out the mission will usually trump arms control/nonproliferation concerns within the Department.
Further, in the past the best policies, in my view, in the international security field often emerged from the policy clash among the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and an independent ACDA-all with their differing viewpoints. ACDA should never have been merged with the Department of State and it was done to placate one member of the United States Senate, Jesse Helms, who happened at the time to be Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, holding hostage the Chemical Weapons Convention.
I agree entirely with Laura’s comment that there should be located on the National Security Council staff a Deputy National Security Advisor dedicated to WMD issues. Such an officer would be in a position to contribute to ensuring continuing effective organization of the arms control/nonproliferation mission in the government.
Comment on June 11, 2008 @ 11:05 am