Costs of Withdrawal from Golan
Israel and Syria have reportedly acknowledged engaging in indirect peace talks under Turkish mediation. This could be very big news, but it raises very big questions about the feasibility and likelihood of an Israeli withdrawal, especially in light of the spectacular failure of Israel’s last two withdrawals from captured territory.
According to the Syrians, Israel has agreed to a withdrawal from the Golan to the armistice line set after the 1948 war of independence. In effect, that would be a complete withdrawal from the Heights, since it was during the period of 1948-1967 that Syria shelled Israeli farms and villages in the Galilee from positions atop the Western Golan. Preventing this behavior in the future, after all, was Israel’s major motivation for annexing the area and promoting settlement there after capturing it from Syria in 1967, and successfully defending it against the Syrians in 1973. From a security standpoint, Israel would clearly only return the Golan to Syria under conditions that guaranteed the security of its northern cities against rocket attacks by Hezbollah or other militants who operate freely in Syrian controlled territory.
But security is not the only obstacle for Israel in giving up the Golan today. I have spent time there and I agree with the many Israelis who consider it one of the region’s great natural sanctuaries. The Golan plateau is full of beautiful streams, waterfalls, canyons, and dramatic vistas in all directions. As a result, it has become a hub in Israel’s domestic tourism industry (the area is filled with small, picturesque villages offering “zimmerim”–Israeli B&Bs), the center of Israel’s growing domestic fine wine industry, and a living memorial to the pitched battles that Israeli soldiers fought to conquer and then defend the area against massive Syrian tank armies in 1967 and 1973.
I recall the Hebrew slogan “Ha am im HaGolan” (literally, “the people are with the Golan,” one of the more common bumper stickers one observes in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem) and wonder whether Israelis are prepared to give up the Golan, even in exchange for real peace with Syria. And I’d note that this will really have to be a decision the Israeli people make as a whole, since a 1999 Law requires a national referendum on any proposal to withdraw from the Golan. Even figures as bitterly opposed as Ehud Barak and Bibi Netanyahu have agreed on the need for national consensus before initiating a Golan withdrawal. With good reason: No one has forgotten that forced withdrawal from Gaza and retreat from Southern Lebanon were each followed by continuing attacks on pre-1967 Israel launched by militants that moved immediately into those areas.
So, if Syrian and Israeli negotiators somehow reach a deal that includes full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan heights, Israelis are going to need a lot more than Syria’s promise not to let Hezbollah set up camp. They’re going to need peace with Syria, PLUS an outside guarantee. One arrangement might be a buffer zone on the Western edge of the heights, monitored by a neutral third party. However, students of middle eastern history will recall that the region has hosted peacekeepers before, and they’ve been best known for clearing out of the way when the shooting starts. Perhaps a US or a really robust UN force could do the job, or perhaps the deal could require Syria to seal off the area to all non-military personnel for a specified time, during which the international community could monitor Syria’s compliance.
Probably the best solution would be a comprehensive peace deal on Israel’s northern border. If it’s true that Syria’s main demand is a withdrawal from the Golan, Syria would have trouble continuing to justify its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon following a real peace deal and Israeli withdrawal. In that case, Syrian dictator Bashar Assad would have the diplomatic triumph he’d need to shore up his legitimacy, and might be less desirous of keeping the volatile Hezbollah trump card up his sleeve with which to torment Israel in the future. Of course, there’s the problem of Iran, but if both Syria and Turkey deny the Iranians access (via Iraq) to Lebanon, they’ll find it a lot harder to get material support (especially weapons) to Hezbollah. And that’s not inconceivable, since Syria and Iran are very recent (and unnatural) allies. Sadly, the negotiating parties seem to be far from a deal, but a productive US role in the negotiations might just be to push both sides toward a more comprehensive agreement that gave Israel security on both northern fronts, and eliminated Syria’s biggest incentive to back violence in the region.
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