It’s amazing how history repeats itself. Today, President Bush announced his full support for Ukraine’s bid to begin the NATO admission process at a meeting with Ukraine’s pro-western leader on his way to the NATO summit in Bucharest. Moscow has voiced its firm objection to NATO expansion, and is backed by France and Germany, which depend on Russian oil and gas to keep the lights on in Paris and Berlin. (Remember, unlike other Slavic states that have departed from Russia’s orbit, Ukraine was never an independent country until 1991, and the country is still viewed by Russians themselves as the cradle of Russian civilization.)

Almost a decade ago, I wrote a piece for the Harvard International Review (At Russia’s Door, June 1999) cautioning that admission of the Baltic States to NATO would precipitate unnecessary conflict with Russia. I argued that while integrating former Soviet Republics (as distinct from former Warsaw Pact members not bordering directly on Russia) could encourage positive political and economic developments in those states, NATO expansion to Russia’s very doorstep was not worth the blatant provocation of Moscow it would entail. They joined anyway.

Here’s what I said back then (try substituting Ukraine for Baltic Republics):

Although simple geography makes the region essentially indefensible by conventional means, NATO strategists predict that committing Western forces to defend the Baltic republics would deter Russia from threatening them altogether. President Clinton paraphrased this policy: “If we extend membership [in NATO] to another country, it means that we are committing the people who wear the uniform of our nation to go and fight and die for that nation, should it ever be attacked … I think it’s a pretty good gamble, because no NATO nation has ever been attacked, ever, not once.” The unfortunate consequence of this gamble, however, is that it assumes and thereby reinforces a rivalry between NATO and Russia, which can only be detrimental to the security of both sides.

Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the NATO Alliance has expanded to include not only the Baltic States—Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia—but seven other former Eastern Bloc countries, including Poland and the Czech Republic. The latter two are now caught up in a US-Russia impasse over missile defense installations in Eastern Central Europe, an utterly unnecessary confrontation that could torpedo meaningful Russian help on the Iranian nuclear issue, and with many other critical relationships in which Russia is a major player. NATO expansion to include former Warsaw Pact states may have been important to their successful democratic transitions and integration with Western Europe, but let’s not ignore the negative consequences.

NATO’s steady eastward march, gobbling up Russia’s traditional “sphere of influence” without offering any blueprint for meaningful engagement with Russia, was understandably taken by Moscow as a slap in the face. It made matters worse that the Russia being sidelined was in full-blown economic, social and military decline. Russia’s best response at the time was to warn that it would have to “reassess” its relationships with the West, rebuild its border defenses at the expense of non-proliferation programs, and rely increasingly on nuclear first strike to compensate for its lost territorial buffer. You can bet that a decade of snarling retreat from Eastern Europe helped convince Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, that the West would only respect Russian security interests when Russia had the strength and the resolve to back them with force.

So where are we today? President Bush and his Ukrainian counterpart appear dead-set on bringing Kiev into the NATO fold. Bush has laughed off Russian opposition to the deal, and denied Russia a “veto” over NATO members’ deliberations. This time, unfortunately, Bush is very wrong to party like it’s 1999. Unlike Yeltsin’s ineffectual grumbling about the Baltic Republics, Russia’s opposition to NATO expansion today has real teeth.

Russia has demonstrated its willingness to cut off oil and gas supplies to Western Europe, and may well purchase France and Germany’s veto on that basis. Even if Ukrainian accession goes forward, Russia can play the energy card to its advantage by punishing Kiev directly, as it did when it shut off the gas lines in the winter of 2005-06. Moscow might also retaliate by reviving a threat that originated in the last NATO expansion crisis: to forge a political union with Ukraine’s northern neighbor, Belarus, whose dictator would be more than happy to help Russian forces encircle NATO’s easternmost outpost. Lastly, Russia can punish the United States, by suspending cooperation with Washington on the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, halting US-backed non-proliferation efforts in Russia’s far-flung WMD facilities, or leaning on its Central Asian neighbors to cease counter-terrorism cooperation with the US.

If I had the President’s ear today, I would advise him to place a call to Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, Putin’s incoming successor. He should tell the Russian leaders that this morning’s tough talk about cutting Russia out of the NATO expansion dialogue was just a very poor April Fool’s Day joke. The US-Russia relationship is of great importance to us, and we respect Russia’s legitimate security concerns. It is because we recognize that the Cold War is long over that we want to give Russia a real seat at NATO’s collective security table. In fact, we feel the most fitting celebration of the Alliance’s upcoming sixtieth anniversary would be to strive for such mutual trust and cooperation with Russia that the next NATO summit could be held in Moscow.

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