Admiral Fallon’s Resignation
Admiral Fallon’s resignation as CENTCOM commander is pretty fresh news, and I’m sure we’ll learn more with time. For now, Fallon apparently resigned because of the appearance of disagreement with the president over the appropriate level of belligerence in U.S. policy towards Iran — or at least in his statement issued at CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, he blamed it on the appearance rather than an actual conflict over Iran policy (reported widely, including here).
The appearance of policy conflict is nothing new for ADM Fallon. Rumors have been flying more or less since the admiral moved from his billet as commander of Pacific Command (where his policy views were controversial, too, but perhaps more quietly controversial because they were over longer-range China policy rather than an ongoing war). When Fallon took his current position at the head of U.S. Central Command, people began to talk about his sharp disagreements with Gen. David Petraeus, the U.S. Commander in Iraq, over both substance (on the surge) and style (Gen. Petraeus’ high-profile comments that sometimes seem to defend the Bush administration in political battles). Of course, Gen. Petraeus is extremely popular with ADM Fallon’s boss and with many other politicians. And that disagreement has been compounded, in the rumors, with an ongoing disagreement over Iran policy (perhaps principally with Vice President Chenney, if the rumors are to be believed). The Iran disagreement perhaps came to a head with the publication of a story in last week’s Esquire.
On Iran, ADM Fallon’s statement says, “I don’t believe there have ever been any differences about the objectives of our policy in the Central Command area of responsibility….” It’s easy to see through this comment: even people who think “we can live with an Iranian nuclear bomb” agree that the U.S. should prefer a non-nuclear Iran to a nuclear-armed one. So we all agree on the objectives of our policy. That statement, though, can certainly cover up intense disagreement about the means of trying to achieve that objective and about whether we’re likely to succeed.
I’m not eager to lionize ADM Fallon. The Esquire article makes it clear that he’s been very busy acting as a diplomat throughout the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility — a defect in the current U.S. government organization that gives the Combatant Commanders so much power and responsibility that they squeeze out the activity and influence of American diplomats and analysts who, in an ideal world, would have better background and analytical capability (the military could presumably focus on applying its own unique, professional expertise in military affairs). The defect in U.S. organization for international affairs is not ADM Fallon’s fault, of course; it partly dates to the much-lauded-but-flawed Goldwater-Nichols Act that reformed American defense organization in the 1980s, compounded by the fact that any country at war will tend to listen disproportionately to its military commanders. But ADM Fallon clearly didn’t lean against the flawed framework.
I also don’t know enough about how ADM Fallon got the CENTCOM job or what he has done inside the complex world of national security decision-making to be able to offer an informed evaluation. In an administration widely acknowledged to carefully vet officers’ policy views before promoting them, it would be a bit remarkable if a “maverick” somehow slipped through the cracks. The Esquire story attributes the move to CENTCOM to Defense Secretary Gates’ foresight: perhaps Gates wanted someone to counterbalance the political influence of Gen. Petraeus. Maybe so, but Gates probably did not make the decision entirely on his own. It may take some time before we figure out the inside military-military and civil-military politics here.
But ADM Fallon’s resignation is an important story — and it takes me back to a theme that I have addressed before on this blog. People who fear that the Bush administration is committed to attacking Iran before the next president takes over have been predicting that Bush would relieve Fallon of command any time now as a step in that direction (one reference among many). If the Admiral is a good military leader, relieving him of command is very costly for our military — and for our political leaders — since good commanders are scarce and take many years to develop. Those who argue that commanders who disagree with presidential policy have only one recourse — resignation — have to face the same fact: resignation is costly, and if it is, indeed, the only option in cases of disagreement, then that tradition certainly will squelch debate and reduce the quality of policy advice.
Wouldn’t we prefer that, at least behind closed doors, our top admirals and generals debate freely and interact with a variety of political leaders (the president, the secretary of defense, Congress, etc.)? I don’t think there’s any evidence that ADM Fallon would have disobeyed an order or intentionally done a bad job of leading a fight that the president ordered him to undertake in his AOR. Forcing him to prematurely end his military career for reasons other than quality of leadership seems a shame, and it seems likely to stifle debate that might improve American policy. The price of offering advice and exercising professional military judgment should not be losing your job, even when the policy that you advocated does not win the policy debate.
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