re: Saddam and his Interrogator
Last night I watched a very interesting interview with Saddam’s interrogator on 60 minutes. There were a number of very important points raised in the discussion ranging from evidence of miscalculation on the part of Saddam in the lead up to the war to the failure of U.S. analysts to understand Saddam’s motivations and why he felt he had to leave an element of doubt re: whether he had WMD’s (we of course know he did not have any weapons and Piro confirms that Saddam’s refusal to come clean were based on fears that were Iran centric – he did not want Tehran to know he did not have WMD’s). A key piece of the interview for me was when Piro discussed why the FBI did not use coercive interrogation techniques (or put another way – why they didn’t torture Saddam to get the intel they needed). His two fold answer is instructive and can be summed up – it is against FBI policy and it does not work.
Yes, George Piro (who, if this interview and comments from his boss are anything to go by, has very bright future ahead of him) understood that from an operational standpoint he could respect the values of the FBI, the Constitution and international law AND increase the chances of running a successful interrogation.
I look forward to a day when we can have a reality based conversation on torture and interrogation in Washington, DC — I think it will require the creation of an Independent Bipartisan Commission to get it done.
FYI – here is the key graft from the Piro interview:
(CBS) Piro says no coercive interrogation techniques, like sleep deprivation, heat, cold, loud noises, or water boarding were ever used. “It’s against FBI policy, first. And wouldn’t have really benefited us with someone like Saddam,” Piro says.
Why not?
“I think Saddam clearly had demonstrated over his legacy that he would not respond to threats, to any type of fear-based approach,” Piro explains.
“So how do you crack a guy like that?” Pelley asks.
“Time,” Piro says.
Months of time, during which Piro manipulated Saddam, creating a relationship based on dependency, trust and emotion. Piro alternated between acts of kindness and provocation. He would jar Saddam with video, including pictures of his fall, and the pulling down of his statues.
“I wanted him to get angry. I wanted him to see those videos and to get angry,” Piro explains. “You want to take him through those various emotions. Happy, angry, sad. When you have someone going through those emotions they’re not able to really control themselves. And they’re more vulnerable during the interview.”
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I tuned in for part of that segment as well. At the very least, I’m glad we had this guy working on Saddam. He’s a lot better than some of the other options.
At the same time, I wonder whether he’s the best interrogator to make the case against harsh interrogation. After all, Saddam is arguably a special case, where both time and unique psychological levers (i.e. the video, and the fact of his fall from power) were available to US agents. Might it not be different with a low level operative with knowledge of a “ticking time bomb”?
To that end, I think our opposition to torture has to be framed primary in self-referential moral terms (we are better than that, and it hurts us to sink to that level) and the negative consequences (whether or not we have a viable alternative, we can never be confident in the results of torture, and may be dangerously misled by false confessions).
Comment on January 28, 2008 @ 6:50 am