This is the sorry state of US-Russia relations some seventeen years after the end of the Cold War: In February, Russia and the US traded harsh words over what each termed US “unilateralism” and Russian “authoritarianism.” This summer, balking at the US plan to base radar stations in Central Europe, Russia pulled out of a treaty limiting armed forces in Europe. And last month, when Condi Rice and Robert Gates flew to Moscow to patch things up, Putin made them wait 45 minutes to see him and then gave them a blistering dressing down. A few days later, Putin flew to Iran, where he treated with both Ahmadinejad and the real power, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, striking deals to speed construction of a nuclear reactor at Bushehr and to sell Iran commercial jets and arms.

But the Cold War really is over. Russia, with Putin at the helm, is operating in its own rational self interest, and though its confidence has been buoyed by windfall oil and gas profits, it has no pervasive ideology driving Cold War style confrontation with the United States. Much of Putin’s apparent coolness toward the US is born of his (thus far justified) suspicion that the US is not interested in a genuine strategic partnership with Russia, and that the Bush administration views him as a dictator to be carefully watched and, when possible, removed. For the time being, Putin’s overwhelming domestic popularity and Russia’s booming economy have insulated the Russian President from US criticism, while the Bush administration has consistently missed opportunities to win Putin’s trust, meet on equal and open terms, and find genuine common ground.

The more things stay the same, the more they change.

A few days ago, Putin suggested he would consider running as his party’s candidate for Prime Minister in Russia’s December parliamentary elections. This is very big news. Rather than trusting official power to a hand-picked successor, Putin could in effect transfer the President’s awesome powers to the premiership, leaving the presidency as a figurehead role for some crony or benign relic. If he chose, Putin could also cool his heels as premier for a few months and then have a special election called to retake the presidency, all within the legal letter of the Russian constitution, and all without surrendering official power for even a moment. Either tactic would probably fly with the Russian people, who would accept such constitutional sleight of hand in exchange for continued stability and prosperity under Putin, at least for the time being.

But if Putin stays in office, he’ll have to contend with the consequences of his own Faustian bargain. As incomes rise in Russia, so will expectations. Business is booming in Russia’s major cities despite ever tighter controls on political speech, the media, and foreign investment in many sectors. Yet the growing economy, and the financial freedom it has given millions of average Russians, is like an inner tube putting mounting pressure on the country’s cramped political space. As Russians enjoy economic freedom, they will naturally devote time and resources to disparate political and social causes, they will begin to demand a more sophisticated and unbiased news media, and their entrepreneurial energy will come to loggerheads with the Kremlin’s exclusive control over “national security industries.” In short, as Russia’s fortunes rise, so will the pressure on Putin to let go of his meticulously accumulated political power. Even (and perhaps especially) if Putin remains in office, Russians themselves will begin clamoring for deeper and friendlier ties with America over the next eight years.

For our part, the United States is about to elect a new President. The winner in 2008 will get a fresh start with many of our erstwhile allies around the world, including the Europeans, Russia’s primary trading partners. Since it is safe to assume that the next administration will be much better than the present one at listening to and appreciating our allies’ concerns, we can expect the new US President to “get the memo” from Brussels, seeing Russia as a critical economic partner, and a friend of our friends, rather than a potential adversary.

Will a slightly weaker President Putin and his new, post-Bush American counterpart suddenly forge a comprehensive alliance in 2009? Not likely. However, it is possible that a confluence of longer term factors will begin by then to alter the basic assumptions of both Russia and the United States about one another. By the end of this decade, Russians and Americans should both be ready for a new, brighter phase in the post-Cold-War relationship. Which leaves only one question: why not cut to the chase?

No related posts.