Reviving one Acronym with Another: NPT and CTBT
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the almost four-decade-old deal among the world’s nuclear and non-nuclear states to control the spread of nuclear technology that can be used for weapons, is on its back. In addition to the five declared “nuclear states” party to the treaty, three non-parties, India, Pakistan and Israel, have developed and deployed nuclear weapons in highly tense and unstable political environments and with unknown safeguards against theft or accidental launch. Moreover, North Korea has all but confirmed a minimal nuclear arsenal, which may already be deployed and aimed at Seoul, and at US forces in the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas. Those weapons could even, loaded on missiles like the Nodong-2 and the Taepodong, hit Japan and US bases in Asia. It hardly requires recapitulation that Iran’s nuclear program is the single greatest threat to global peace and stability today. Whether or not Tehran develops a serviceable nuclear deterrent, its brash defiance and calculated ambiguity in the face of Western pressure has pushed more responsible players to plan for what nobody wants: a US or Israeli preemptive strike on Iran.
We are in these dire straits largely thanks to the breakdown of the NPT’s central bargain: that if non-nuclear states gave up the right to develop nuclear arsenals, the five nuclear states would grant them reasonable access to peaceful nuclear technology, and would themselves undertake robust and credible efforts to reduce their deadly nuclear stockpiles. While the treaty’s five nuclear powers (coincidentally, also the five permanent UN Security Council members) hardly bear direct responsibility for other states’ choices, they certainly have not helped. Aside from a few Cold War driven reductions in US and Russian nuclear stockpiles, the nuclear states have done decidedly little to deliver on their promise. It should not be a surprise, therefore, that leading non-nuclear states, especially those facing what they consider existential military threats, have bucked international censure to develop the ultimate deterrent.
Whether this worrying trend is reversible depends on whether the US, Russia, and the other leading nuclear powers can restore strength and credibility to the bargain underpinning the NPT. Some experts believe there may be a way to do that.
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), opened for signature in 1996, prohibits all states parties from undertaking or assisting other states to undertake nuclear weapons tests, including nuclear explosions of any kind. Although the US signed the treaty in 1996, the Senate has as yet not ratified it, sending the signal to aspiring nuclear powers that the world’s leading nuclear weapons state may still intend to test and deploy new, even more destructive nuclear weapons. Under such circumstances, why should an India, a Pakistan, or even an Iran, refrain from developing its own modest nuclear deterrent? On the other hand, if the US were to ratify CTBT, even after more than a decade, the move could give gravitas to a renewed commitment to the NPT, and offer proponents of that venerable treaty as the basis for future non-proliferation the life support they need.
On the domestic front, ratification will be no easy task. First, it will require a sea change in attitudes on the Hill. Senators will have to acknowledge, as our British allies recently have, that we cannot call for universal compliance with the letter and spirit of the NPT without offering it ourselves. Our national laboratories and related executive agencies must abandon plans for future nuclear tests, and confirm that policy change publicly. Top weapons experts acknowledge that even the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program, ostensibly essential to ensure the durability of the US nuclear deterrent, does not require testing in violation of the CTBT. They might be persuaded to cooperate by a deal explicitly linking full funding for the RRW with CTBT ratification. Finally, the President should make a major speech endorsing ratification, reaffirming the US commitment to reducing our own nuclear stockpiles pursuant to the NPT, and at least aspiring to eventual nuclear disarmament. After all, if the most heavily nuclear armed juggernaut cannot hope for and imagine a world without nuclear weapons, how can we ask more vulnerable states to make that aspiration a reality?
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I definitely agree with the fact that by ratifying CTBT the US would make a pretty positive step in upholding the non-proliferation regime. However, preventing Iran from going nuclear will probably be crucial for attaining this goal. Below I outline my proposal of a step forward towards resolving the Iranian impasse.
Resolving the Iranian nuclear impasse – Time to Shift Priorities
The impasse around the Iranian nuclear program has become one of the most burning issues on the current international agenda. The UN Security Council has already passed three resolutions regarding the disputed Iranian nuclear program – UNSCR1696, UNSCR1737 and UNSCR 1747 under which Iran was demanded to suspend its enrichment-related activities and relatively symbolic sanctions were imposed on Iran for non-compliance. Iran is pursuing its nuclear program contending that it is its inalienable right under art. 3 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (hereinafter the NPT) to have a full nuclear cycle and that its nuclear program is of entirely peaceful nature. However, IAEA Board of Directors has several times underscored in its reports that it is unable to confirm the peaceful character of the Iranian nuclear program. Moreover, the US and EU3 (France, UK and Germany) are fearing that the Iranian nuclear program has a military nuclear dimension and that art. 2 of the NPT makes the demands of the UN Security Council legal in this case. To top it all, the US and Israel have voiced their commitment not to allow Iran to attain the nuclear weapons capability which implies that military action against Tehran is not ruled out. One of the possible indications of this is the recent US reinforcement of its navy in the Persian Gulf (Washington Post). At the meantime Russia and China are reluctant to exert significant pressure on Tehran. The recent developments are even more worrisome. A last-week short-notice inspection by IAEA revealed that Iran has already installed around 1300 centrifuges in Natanz. With another 2000 centrifuges Iran will according to IAEA estimates probably be able to produce the amount of enriched uranium sufficient to acquire the NW-capability. Though there are diverging estimates on how long it will take Iran to produce a nuclear bomb (from 2009 to 2015) the aforementioned technological advancements of Iran only add to the gravity of the situation.
What are the main hazards of this impasse persisting unchanged? So far the essence of the P-5 approach towards Iran was to demand that Iran halt all the enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and imposing sanctions targeting only the possible military dimension of the Iranian nuclear program. However, this strategy seems to be short of its goals to prevent the proliferation of NW in Iran and avoid further escalation which may lead to unilateral military action against Iran from the US and (or) Israeli part. Moreover, Iran has already significantly reduced its cooperation with IAEA under Majlis law of 27.12.06 and may even withdraw from the NPT which will mean that its nuclear program will be conducted unchecked with hack a lot of risks which may result from this.
In the light of the facts mentioned above, I believe that time has come for the international community to shift priorities in addressing the Iranian impasse. To reach the goals of preventing nuclear proliferation in Iran, preventing a unilateral action against Tehran and resultant skyrocketing of oil and gas prices and overall appeasing the volatile Middle-East region the international community should first of all abandon its zero-enrichment demand from Tehran as utterly unrealistic and instead demand that Tehran freeze the number of centrifuges at the current level of around 1300. In addition the IC should preserve the demands to ratify the Additional Protocol, stop causing hurdles to IAEA inspections and take all the transparency measures as set out in the IAEA Board reports.
Why is this shift of demands a virtue? First of all, it actually constitutes a recognition of Iran’s right to full nuclear cycle on its soil though with significant constraints. It will be much more difficult for Iranian hardliners to justify and legitimize their defiance of this generous proposal and if nevertheless Iran rejects it this will even be a clear indication of at least the fact that Iran is not going to cooperate with the international community and cast even more doubt on the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program. In addition to this various authoritative analyses such as the one by Kenneth M. Polack suggest that the Iranian leadership is not unite and the camp of pragmatic conservatives may affect the Ahmadi Nejad’s rigid stance which may become impossible to legitimize in the light of concessions made by the international community.
In return for Iranian cooperation significant incentives should be put on the table including a modified last summer package of incentives from the Permanent-5+Germany, a joint fuel bank venture to compensate Iran for the restriction of the number of operating centrifuges and probably some other carrots in the field of investment and, what is the most important, negative security guarantees from the US and Israel. The US may also propose Iran direct bilateral negotiations on a range of issues of mutual concern.
This will form the substance of an extremely generous grand bargain for Tehran which should be included in full or referred to in the UN Security Council resolution. The resolution should give Iran certain period for compliance after the expiration of which or outright refusal of Iran to cooperate stricter sanctions should be imposed on Iran such as complete travel bans and assets freezes of the members of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and (or) restrictions on exports of refined oil products and withdrawing the EU government loan guarantees estimating $ 20 bln. In the event of reluctance of Russia and China to apply such strict sanctions the US and EU3 should threaten Iran with forming a coalition of the willing which will on its own apply the aforementioned sanctions against Iran. These sanctions are very likely to enjoy much larger international legitimacy in the light of potential Iranian defiance of a generous proposal of the international community.
All points considered, I would like to reiterate that the current stalemate over the Iranian nuclear issue is set to degrade unless the international community and the US and EU3 in particular change their utterly unrealistic zero-enrichment demand from Iran. The proposal outlined in this paper is of course no universal cure and requires further elaboration but in my view its application would constitute an important step forward towards resolving the hazardous Iranian impasse.
Comment on October 27, 2007 @ 11:25 am