On Wednesday, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and their negotiating teams met in Jerusalem to prepare for the US-sponsored conference to be held next month. The Bush Administration has convened this conference in order to break through the current stalemate of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and to give the President’s (and Condi Rice’s) Middle East legacy a boost. If the President is serious about achieving either of those objectives he must push for a more comprehensive agreement than the vague joint statement that Prime Minister Olmert is seeking.

President Bush should encourage the most detailed, explicit statement possible for the advancement of Palestinian statehood. The negotiations have been stalled for so long that a broad-brush declaration will do nothing to change the status-quo. However, if concrete, achievable goals are the result of this conference, there is a much greater chance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process can be pushed out of its current inertia. With increased prospects for Palestinian statehood comes a boost for moderate Arab governments in the region. This will boost American credibility and standing in the Arab and Islamic world, hopefully improving on the current lack of American moral authority in the region.

Perhaps the linchpin to the Annapolis conference in November is the participation of key Arab countries. More specifically, three countries are absolutely crucial to the success of the conference; Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Syria is important because of the proximity to Israel and their ability to stifle any chance for peace by operating through Hezbollah. If they are not included on the “inside” of any peace negotiations, they may continue to gravitate toward the Iranian orbit, and thus, attempt to ruin any chance of peace for Israel. Saudi Arabia is crucial because of the influence that they wield over other Arab nations. They would like to see this summit build on the Saudi Initiative (launched in 2002) that has been endorsed by the Arab League, and thus could grant any deal struck by the Palestinians legitimacy in the Arab and Muslim world. Technically, the Saudis are still in a state of war with Israel (since 1948), making these negotiations tricky. The United States does have leverage over the Saudis, including the potential hold-up of a multi-billion dollar weapons sale, thus ensuring a high-level Saudi commitment. Finally, Egypt, which has close ties to Gaza (where Hamas rules), has also been unwilling to commit to the November summit. Here the United States could also use generous foreign aid as leverage to convince a high-level Egyptian delegation to attend. Without these three nations, any document produced at the conference would lack sufficient Arab support needed for tangible progress. The best way to guarantee high-level Arab support is to make public calls for a strong agreement during the run-up to the summit. In the next few weeks, if the United States is seen as working diligently for a summit that will not simply be a photo opportunity, it will be looked on more favorably by the leading Arab nations. Therefore, they will be more willing to play a constructive role in the November summit.

Obviously, no matter what the result of November’s summit, there are numerous and challenging obstacles in the way of progress for Israel and Palestine. Both Olmert and Abbas are politically weak and will have difficulty selling a cooperative document to a segment of their population. Recently, Qassam rockets have continued to be fired upon Israeli territory from Gaza, leading Israel to declare Gaza a “hostile entity” and authorizing IDF operations in the territory. Finally, there is the danger that a strong document would raise Palestinian hopes, only to see them dashed again, thus leading to a scenario similar to the one that resulted in the second intifada.

While these problems are significant, they are not excuses for avoiding a real push towards peace. With support from Arab nations, the conference could mark a turning point from the current acrimony that embodies Middle East politics. Finally, with a successful conference and a recognizable path to Palestinian statehood, perhaps the Bush Administration can rescue some of the United States’ moral authority in the region. That is why the run-up to the conference may be just as important as the meeting in November. By sending a strong signal that a real plan will be worked out at the summit, The United States can inject much needed energy and Arab participation into the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

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