Yesterday’s arrest of three Islamists plotting major bombings in Germany raises an important question as Congress debates Iraq policy this month: How would a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq affect the broader campaign against Al Qaeda and violent jihadism?

Opinion on this is sharply divided. President Bush and his supporters argue that Iraq is the central front in the war on terror and that withdrawal would embolden and strengthen Al Qaeda in Iraq. What’s more, they claim, withdrawal would allow Al Qaeda members to leave Iraq and try to attack us within our borders, as the group did on 9/11.

Many Democrats and antiwar activists make a very different argument—that withdrawal would make us safer from terrorism by allowing us to devote more resources to bolstering our homeland security and fighting Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. They also say that withdrawing from Iraq would stem the flow of new recruits to Al Qaeda by taking away a major grievance against America.

These arguments could not be further apart, yet it’s not obvious which one of them is more correct. They are predictions, not statements of fact. The reality is we don’t—and can’t—know for sure what the consequences of withdrawing from Iraq will be for our struggle against Al Qaeda. What’s clear is that our best assessment of the consequences should shape our Iraq policy.

My own best guess is that a precipitous or total withdrawal would make us less secure, but a carefully calibrated partial withdrawal would make us more secure. If we pull out all of our combat troops, the sectarian war in Iraq will probably intensify, leading the Sunni tribes now helping us fight Al Qaeda to shift their focus to battling Shiite militias. As a result, Al Qaeda would be able to operate more easily. Some members of Al Qaeda in Iraq might then begin to plot attacks on U.S. citizens or interests outside Iraq, increasing the threat to our security.

This danger could be avoided by withdrawing our troops gradually, while leaving enough troops in Iraq to keep heavy pressure on Al Qaeda. A partial withdrawal would allow our worn-out military to get needed rest and training and would free up troops for a greater presence in Afghanistan or possible strikes against terrorist leaders in Pakistan. But by keeping sufficient military capability in Iraq to fight Al Qaeda in collaboration with Iraqi forces, we would minimize the risk of Al Qaeda members leaving Iraq to attack us elsewhere or here at home. The maintenance of a substantial military presence in Iraq would also help us deter greater intervention by Iran or Saudi Arabia and give us a chance to act to prevent genocide if the sectarian war escalates dramatically in brutality.

So, what should Congress do? Rather than either giving Bush a blank check or setting a firm deadline for the completion of a withdrawal, Congress should mandate the administration to begin implementing a partial withdrawal aimed at achieving our multiple objectives of combating Al Qaeda in and outside of Iraq, limiting the scope of Iraq’s sectarian war, and maintaining the health of our military. Unlike many Democratic withdrawal proposals, this legislative mandate could probably attract sufficient Republican backing to pass the Senate.

In an encouraging step, Harry Reid recently signaled an interest in compromising with Republicans to reach a bipartisan agreement on reducing troop levels in Iraq. The arrests in Germany highlight the importance of getting this right—not just for the future of Iraq, but also for our own security.

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