You write, “The first point, that democracies invariably place a higher value on human rights might generally be true, but there are certainly exceptions. Democracies tend to be quite concerned about the rights of their own citizens, but no more or less concerned than authoritarian states about the rights of others, particularly during periods of perceived threat.”

Granted, in general states’ uppermost concern is that of their own preservation and livelihoods. I don’t deny this. However, with that said, there are certainly instances of democracies making foreign policy decisions that also take into account other factors such as human rights and humanitarian concerns. I’m not aware of authoritarian states giving much weight to these concerns. Therefore, I argue that in general democracies are more concerned with these issues globally and more apt to include those concerns in their foreign policy decisions. This does not deny that self interest is also quite important.

You write, “The latter point does not, and cannot, account for the stance of the largest democratic state on the planet, India, which opposed BOTH the Iraq War AND the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia out of concern for the precedent that such interventions set. ”

In terms of India’s position on Iraq there was widespread public opposition in the country to the invasion and also to sending troops after the invasion. Perhaps the Indian public simply saw the invasion as unjustified and this was reflected in the foreign policy stances of its leaders. If you feel that Iraq was a mistake, wouldn’t this be an argument for including other countries in the such decisions. If India (and other democracies) had been listened to, we might not be where we are now. In a “Concert of Democracies” I would expect that the largest democracy in the world would certainly have a seat at the table.

You write, “We can expect that future policymakers, Democrats and Republicans, who are bent on military intervention will accept the support of any states willing to give it, and they will ignore the warnings and objections of those opposed.”

Isn’t this precisely the reason to create a more formal mechanism to provide legitimacy so that we don’t simply end up with Democrats and Republicans simply accepting the support of those countries that agree and ignoring dissenters.

Thanks again for your comments!

To those who celebrate bipartisanship as the key to climbing out of our numerous foreign policy crises, I say that it is bipartsanship that got us here. Bipartisan support for war with Iraq. Bipartisan support for confrontation with Iran. Bipartisan support for NATO expansion and other policies that are pushing us towards another Cold War with Russia. And, above all, bipartisan support — among policy elites, but not the public at large — for a continuation of American hegemony.

My full response, co-authored with David Rieff, appears in The National Interest online.
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=15128

On the specific point of legitimacy, and the role that might be played by a Community of Democracies to bestow — ex post facto, if necessary — the legitimacy stamp of approval upon those military interventions not related to defending vital U.S. national interests, and not to deal with an imminent threat to U.S. security, Brian (echoing Daalder and Kagan) writes:

“interventions to stop such atrocities as genocide are slowed down or stopped in the Security Council by nondemocratic states such as Russia and China. Democracies place a higher value on human rights and other such ideals than do authoritarian states. Moreover, authoritarian states are reluctant to support a precedent of intervention based on anything other than self defense for fear that it will come back to haunt them vis a vis their own actions.”

The first point, that democracies invariably place a higher value on human rights might generally be true, but there are certainly exceptions. Democracies tend to be quite concerned about the rights of their own citizens, but no more or less concerned than authoritarian states about the rights of others, particularly during periods of perceived threat.

The latter point does not, and cannot, account for the stance of the largest democratic state on the planet, India, which opposed BOTH the Iraq War AND the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia out of concern for the precedent that such interventions set.

So, what then? When our own national security is not at stake, when we seek to intervene on behalf of others, what if some states disagree with our assessment of what can and should be done? We can expect that future policymakers, Democrats and Republicans, who are bent on military intervention will accept the support of any states willing to give it, and they will ignore the warnings and objections of those opposed. That is what Bill Clinton did in 1999. That is what George Bush did in 2003. And I am confident, so long as the interventionist consensus remains dominant within the foreign policy community, that the next president will do the same.