This week, the Pakistani government has laid siege upon a radical mosque in Islamabad, exchanging gunfire with the extremists that are holed up there. Today, President Pervez Musharraf’s plane was fired upon in an apparent assassination attempt as he left for storm-ravaged Baluchistan. This follows riots in March that were prompted by a judicial crisis when the president suspended Pakistan’s chief justice for alleged abuses of office. Since then, protesters have frequently taken to the streets to rally against what they see as an attempt by Musharraf to snuff out fledgling democratic institutions and ease his way to another term. These incidents, combined with the greater radicalization of the urban population, beg the question, what would the United States do if its man in Pakistan were to fall? What are America’s long-term options in a country that is so volatile, yet so vital in the fight against transnational terrorism and global jihadism?

Current US policy towards Pakistan has been to provide whatever military support they needed to help in the Global War on Terror. Over the last five years, the United States has given Pakistan 10 billion dollars in assistance, with most of it going directly to the military. Additionally, there are classified funds that have gone straight into Musharraf’s coffers as reward for capturing or killing Al-Qaeda terrorists in Pakistan. With so much money weighted toward the Pakistani military, it suggests that the United States is emphasizing short-term tactical goals rather than a long-term strategic alliance, reminiscent of our disastrous allegiances during the Cold War.

While Pakistan had early success against Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters, recently terrorists have been using the Pakistani-Afghani border as their safe haven. President Musharraf has refused to put his troops in harm’s way by sending them out to fight in these borderlands. The Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan in part because they have remained unmolested in the tribal lands of Waziristan after Musharraf’s deal with the tribal leaders. Under a 2006 peace agreement, the Pakistani military would leave Waziristan and tribal chiefs would be responsible for security in the area. Clearly, the United States is seeing diminishing returns on their investment in Pakistan’s military capability. Meanwhile, less than ten percent of the assistance money given to Pakistan is earmarked for institutional reform or infrastructure building. With little emphasis on the long-term development of the country, it is assured that Pakistan will continue to churn out madrassas that preach violence against the United States and encourage more terrorism and that standoffs with the US-backed government are to continue.

So what can be done to change the status quo? What can the United States do to enhance its long-term security vis-à-vis Pakistan? Well, the options are not ideal. For being such a large donor to Pakistan, the United States has very little leverage when it comes to dealing with Musharraf. We need Pakistan to help combat the insurgency in Afghanistan, and to get them to comply, we need to bribe them with money. Additionally, there is a dearth of alternatives to Musharraf’s rule. The last two prime ministers, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, enjoy little support in the country (though there have been talks of bringing Bhutto back in a power sharing arrangement) and, to make matters worse, parts of the country are going through a “Talibanization”. Finally, no matter what happens in an election, the Pakistani military and shadowy intelligence services will still be in control of much of the politics.

All these factors are frightening for a nuclear-armed state. Since September 11^th, Plan A for Pakistan has been to give Musharraf the money and equipment he needs to fight the terrorists in Waziristan and maintain control in Islamabad. For years, the United States has seen him as the only possible force for stability in the country. However, with Musharraf’s support eroding and the Taliban surging, it is time for the United States to formulate a Plan B. Tying more of the assistance money to domestic reform, especially in the education sector, would help average Pakistanis and create the basis for real social development outside of radical Islam. One possible solution would be the International Youth Opportunity Fund, established by the 9/11 commission. This bipartisan initiative could be used to help fund moderate education in Pakistan that accurately reflects the world outside the Middle East. With money from the IYOF, the educational system could be turned away from extremist madrassas that teach a misguided view of the world and the United States. Finally, American policy makers should also formulate a plan for life without Musharraf, as he has been the target of numerous assassination attempts and his popularity has continued to plummet with general population. At the very least, Pakistan should move to a more prominent place on Washington’s priorities list. If not, it may force itself upon America’s attention in the worst way possible.

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