Being A Superpower Means Never Having To Say You’re Sorry
Well, now that the United Nations Security Council last week passed its latest sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program let us take a moment to ponder the wonderfully wacky world of nuclear proliferation. In this world the letter of the law matters less than the power of the sheriff enforcing it.
Consider the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which came into force in 1970, which both the United States and Iran constantly refer to in the back and forth over Iran’s nuclear program, which the United States says is cover for a program to acquire nuclear weapons.
The NPT obligates the five acknowledged nuclear-weapon states (the United States, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, France, and China) not to transfer nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices, or their technology to any non-nuclear-weapon state. Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties undertake not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. They are required also to accept safeguards to detect diversions of nuclear materials from peaceful activities, such as power generation, to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
To vastly simplify things the United States says Iran violates the NPT, given its history of not declaring all its facilities and activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iran says its nuclear program started back in the 1970s under the Shah, with the U.S. blessing, when Westinghouse was eagerly trying to sell Iran nuclear reactors and despite numerous IAEA inspections no proof has been found that Iran is embarked on a nuclear weapons program.
One really interesting thing about this is that the United States is not really in the position it should be to point the finger of J’ accuse at Iran. And why is that? Because the United States itself historically has not done a good job of complying with the treaty. Take the NPT’s Article 6, for example. It says, “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”
The truth is that the United States continues to rely on nuclear weapons as a mainstay of its military defense, even though almost no one can come up with a real life scenario for using them, other than for deterrence. And if that is the only justification, that we have many thousands more than are required.
But, is the U.S. downsizing its reliance on nukes, per the treaty, not to mention its own national interest? Of course not; instead it is full steam ahead with programs like the Stockpile Stewardship program, the Reliable Replacement Warhead, which is jargon for a new nuclear bomb, or Complex 2030, the nuclear weapons making infrastructure of the future. The Bush administration’s spending plan for fiscal 2008 includes a more than three-fold increase in funds for the development of a next-generation nuclear warhead.
In fact, on March 2 the U.S. Energy Department announced a contract to develop the nation’s first new hydrogen bomb in two decades, involving collaboration between three national weapons laboratories.
Is there a compelling reason to do this? No. Experts assembled by American Association for the Advancement of Science, the world’s largest scientific organization declined in a report February 18 to endorse a Bush administration plan for redesigning all U.S. nuclear weapons, citing a lack of reliable cost estimates and of proven methods for verifying whether the new hydrogen bombs will work without test explosions. A similar double standard can be found in Great Britain, where on March 14 the House of Commons approved the government’s plans to begin the process of replacing the Trident nuclear weapons system.
So, at least for some countries, their policies on nuclear proliferation can be summarized thusly; do as I say, not as I do.
Related posts:
Mr. Isenberg has a serious problem with selective memory or truth.
First, while linking to the NNSA’a announcment of the RRW selection, he then proceeds to ignore its contents, and I must take issue with him. (In the spirit of full disclosure, I am employed by a contractor to the NNSA and am in the business of Stockpile Stewardship and will be involved with some details of the RRW’s eventual emergence, though I speak here only as a representative of myself.)
Mr. Isenberg asks:
“But, is the U.S. downsizing its reliance on nukes, per the treaty, not to mention its own national interest?” Then, ignoring the facts he answers his own question: “Of course not; instead it is full steam ahead with programs like the Stockpile Stewardship program, the Reliable Replacement Warhead, which is jargon for a new nuclear bomb, or Complex 2030, the nuclear weapons making infrastructure of the future.”
First, Stockplie Stewardship is Clinton-era program intended to, in part, maintain thousands of existing weapons as “in-place spares” since we know that nuclear weapons degrade over time and, for which, many parts are no longer made. The RRW is a simpler design that requires less production capacity (Complex 2030), the use of several non-toxic materials in place of the “bad actors” our workers and the environment presently have to face, and will require no testing. In addition, the RRW will be much harder for terrorists to use against us if stolen. All in all the RRW will allow a significant reduction in the numbers of stockplie weapons we retain; all in keeping with the NPT. In case Mr Isenberg, and his readers missed it, this is a good thing.
It should be noted, also, that while Mr. Isenberg objects to the U.S.’s continued reliance on nuclear weapons for deterence, and later invokes the AAAS as a body of experts opposed to RRW, he gives short shrift to the fact that their objection was based on a concern that the new weapons would not work. No critique of deterence there!
Finally, Mr. Isenberg, in his fourth papragraph, makes two disigenuous implications. First, by refering to Westinghouse he deliberately confuses pressurized water reactors for electricity production, with the application of reactors for weapons development. These are “apples and oranges.” The PWRs sold to the Shah would have had no application to developing weapons-related material. Second, Mr. Isenberg implies that there is some moral equivalence between the U.S.and its history and Islamic Iran. I heartily object, and in an honest moment, so would Mr. Isenberg.
(See my discussion at: http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/02/nuclear_arms_and_moral_equival.html )
The U.S. is indeed a superpower, and certainly the most benevolent superpower in recorded history. We have acts in our history that may merit “saying your sorry” (e.g., the Mexican War) but having nuclear weapons isn’t one of them.
Comment on March 27, 2007 @ 8:58 am
In regard to Mr. Estabrooks reply there is no problem with my memory or interpretation of the facts. Of course, I’m not employed by the government and thus have no financial or career interest to protect.
I don’t know the significance of the SSP and the Clinton administration. I never wrote about any specific U.S. administration. Though if one wants to find the usual NNSA boiler plate justification for it, see http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Strat032007/DAgostino_Testimony032007.pdf
Mr. Estabrooks can argue that the RRW is a “simpler” design but the truth is that it simply is a design for a new nuclear weapon. And since he is interested in administrations we might note the RRW was initiated in 2004 by the Bush administration, and has emerged as the centerpiece of the administration’s proposed overhaul of the complex maintaining the U.S. inventory of approximately 10,000 nuclear warheads.
As for my supposed objection to U.S. reliance on nukes for deterrence what I actually wrote was, “The truth is that the United States continues to rely on nuclear weapons as a mainstay of its military defense, even though almost no one can come up with a real life scenario for using them, other than for deterrence. And if that is the only justification, that we have many thousands more than are required.” That is not the same as Estabrooks misrepresentation, “Mr. Isenberg to the U.S.’s continued reliance on nuclear weapons for deterence.”
As for technical objections to RRW the AAAS is hardly the only group to find the justifications for RRW specious. Last November 29 the NNSA reported that a recently completed study on plutonium aging conducted by the JASON defense advisory group found that the material remains viable in nuclear weapon pits for a minimum of 85 years, much longer than the current estimate of 45 to 60 years. The finding may impact on plans to move to a new Reliable Replacement Warhead, as part of the argument for the RRW has been that plutonium aging could potentially jeopardize the reliability of current weapons in the future. Nevertheless, not be bothered by a little thing like inconvenient facts, the Nuclear Weapons Council, made up of senior Defense Department and National Nuclear Security Administration officials, said on December 1 that they plan to continue developing a new nuclear weapons program even though the JASON and other recent studies suggest that existing stockpiles are in better condition than had been thought.
The point of mentioning reactors to Iran is that the Iranian nuclear program has been known about for decades. Many, though admittedly not all, of the facilities that the U.S. now decries in Iran were properly notified to the IAEA many, many years ago and nobody had a problem with them.
As for the “most benevolent superpower in recorded history” I’m sure that every great power or empire throughout history has had an apologist saying exactly the same thing, whether it was the Romans, Spanish, French, Belgians in the Congo, British,…
Comment on March 27, 2007 @ 10:07 am
I greatly appreciate Mr. Isenberg’s frank and rapid response. Regrettably, he remains incorrect and subtly disingenuous. The fact that I have a “financial or career interest to protect” is a truth of which I am not ashamed. But it’s also moot. The truth about nuclear weapons programs stands wheher I work on them or not.
Mr Isenberg’s admitted ignorance re. the Clinton administration and the Stockpile Stewardship Program is also moot. The SSP has consequences that drive a larger stockpile, irrespective of who initiated the program. Yes, the RRW is a Bush admin. program, and its benefits still stand, no matter who the president is. Mr. Isenberg’s insistance that the Bush admin. has plans for “maintaining the U.S. inventory of approximately 10,000 nuclear warheads” is simply delusional. First of all, the Treaty of Moscow of 2002
( http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/18016.htm ) calls for reductions in stockplies to ~2000 weapons. Second, if Pres. Bush wants us to have 10,000 nuclear “warheads”, we better get to work making them. They don’t exist right now.
Mr Isenberg also notes:
“Last November 29 the NNSA reported that a recently completed study on plutonium aging conducted by the JASON defense advisory group found that the material remains viable in nuclear weapon pits for a minimum of 85 years, much longer than the current estimate of 45 to 60 years. The finding may impact on plans to move to a new Reliable Replacement Warhead, as part of the argument for the RRW has been that plutonium aging could potentially jeopardize the reliability of current weapons in the future.” Here is is absolutely correct. Pit aging was indeed “part” of the argument for the RRW, but by no means the only or the most important.
Finally, the implied ad hominem attack that I am an “apologist” for the undefensible United States is taken as a compliment. I have no doubt about the good we have done, and are doing, around the world. But that’s another topic.
Comment on March 27, 2007 @ 10:47 am
I also appreciate Mr. Estabrooks rapid response. Before going any further let’s acknowledge at the outset that one of the hallmarks of a good propagandist or polemicist is to distort words and impute different intentions to others’ words. Mr. Estabrooks shows better than average abilities in this regard. If his current job doesn’t work out he can possibly find work as a national security analyst at Fox News.
First re “Mr Isenberg’s admitted ignorance” I have admitted no ignorance. Go and look at what was actually written. Mr. Estabrooks wrote, “First, Stockplie Stewardship is Clinton-era program intended to, in part, maintain thousands of existing weapons as “in-place spares” since we know that nuclear weapons degrade over time and, for which, many parts are no longer made.”
I replied, “I don’t know the significance of the SSP and the Clinton administration.” That is not ignorance; that is dismissing the relevance of the Clinton Administration that Mr. Estabrooks finds so noteworthy. Those in the nuclear weapons complex have been especially looking for a way to justify their establishment ever since President George H. W. Bush signed into law the unilateral declaration to forego full-scale nuclear weapons testing October 2, 1992. The SSP is one of their responses. Defeating ratification of the CTBT (another story) is another. If it hadn’t happened under Clinton it would have happened under someone else.
As for any RRW “benefits” one can only hope there are some. I am sure that from the viewpoint of Mr. Estabrook’s sector building new nuclear weapons, justified under the hope, if not the reality, that it will eventually reduce the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal is a “benefit.”
As for the Treaty of Moscow, yes, the agreement commits the United States and Russia to operationally deploy fewer than 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads apiece by Dec. 31, 2012.
But he does not mention that SORT does not spell out how the United States and Russia should reduce their deployed nuclear forces, leaving each to proceed as it sees fit. In fact, the treaty leaves quite a bit of latitude: Warheads removed from deployment under SORT do not have to be destroyed but only stored separately from the missiles, bombers, and submarines used to deliver them. As Secretary of State Colin Powell explained to senators in July 2002 testimony, “The treaty will allow you to have as many warheads as you want.”
Put aside for the moment the fact that the treaty is not binding and that we are far from the SORT goal. Instead, let’s consider his point that the U.S. does not have 10,000 nuclear weapons.
His comments reminds me of the saying that figures don’t lie, but liars can figure. What Mr. Estabrooks neglects, or let’s assume the best intention on his part, and assume he is just ignorant of, is that Washington currently deploys nearly 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads, and Moscow fields almost 5,000. These tallies do not account for stored strategic warheads or less powerful weapons known as tactical nuclear warheads that are not covered by SORT. The entire U.S. nuclear arsenal totals roughly 10,000 warheads, while Russia’s is estimated to be nearly double that.
Specifically, the Pentagon has custody of approximately 10,000 stockpiled warheads, of which about 5735, as of last summer, are considered active or operational. Yes, DOE’s stockpile plan indicates that some 4,000 warheads are to be retired and eventually disassembled at the Pantex Plant. When that happens I will be the first to applaud, though I’m not holding my breath.
As long as Mr. Estabrooks is dwelling on numbers he might also have mentioned that of the more than 70,000 warheads produced by the U.S. since 1945, more than 60,000 have been diassembled, as of mid-last year. But, and this is an important but, DOE retains more than 12,000 intact plutonium pits from dismanted warheads and stores them at Pantex.
Mr. Estabrooks tries to minimize my point re the Jason study impact on the RRW by saying there are other arguments but does not mention what they are.
Finally, re “Finally, the implied ad hominem attack that I am an “apologist” for the undefensible” in my experience I did not write he was an “apologist.” I did imply that his arguments were influenced by who and what he works for. I should have not implied it. Rather I should have stated it declaratively and factually.
Note that I never wrote the word “undefensible.” The fact that Mr. Estabrooks uses it speaks volumes.
Comment on March 27, 2007 @ 12:07 pm
It is not just that a superpower never has to say sorry; it never has to admit it is wrong, partial or dishonest – or simply playing favourites. The US policy towards other actual or potential nuclear powers, can be simplified into the proposition: friends like India, Israel and Pakistan, good; enemies (or merely those of an independent disposition) like Iran and South Korea, bad. Very neat, illogical, de-stabilising; very cynical and dishonest.
Iran is flanked by countries whose possession of nuclear weapons is not a source of worry to the US. It should be. It is by no means certain that Iran is working towards nuclear weapons. It has other, far more urgent reasons for wanting nuclear power. Even if it were, why should we be surprised?
If the US were serious about the so-called threat to regional stability, it should be pressing for a de-nuclearised Middle East. I hear nobody calling for that, merely a rising chorus of moral outrage and drum-banging about Iran – preparing us all, as you have been saying, David, for an attack. Forget WMD. There are other reasons for an attack on Iran, not dissimilar from the reasons for the invasion of Iraq. Are we to be dragged deeper into the mire for these objectives?
This is a good deal more dangerous than not saying sorry.
Joe Roeber
Comment on March 28, 2007 @ 11:36 am
Mr. Roeber if you truly believe that Iran is attempting to acquire nuclear arms out of self defense I would refer you to the numerous statements by the leadership in Iran (Ahmadinejad, and the Ayatollah) that are totally aggressive in nature. In addition to this, the acceptance of a state policy to bring about the “coming of the 12th Imam” does not seem defensive to me.
The fact of the matter is that Iran is a theocracy ruled by fundamentalist extremists. Religion is by nature non-rational. It requires more than simply reason, but instead a “leap of faith”. Therefore a government ruled by a religion, which is not a secular institution, does not have to justify its actions by reason but instead by its religion. Furthermore when that government is the provider of religious instruction it in essence never has to justify itself expect by its own words.
That, Mr. Roeber, is why Iran cannot be allowed to obtain the most destructive weapons known to man, because Iran does not have to be rational in their use of nuclear weapons. A reasoned person will always come to the conclusion that using nuclear weapons in this modern world, where nuclear war could theoretically happen, cannot be acceptable based on the idea of mutually assured destruction. A non-rational person believes that consequences are no matter if the action brings the desired result, i.e. the destruction of the state of Israel and the coming of the 12th Imam.
That is why responsible countries such as the United States are allowed to have nuclear weapons and irresponsible countries such as Iran and North Korea cannot be allowed to have nuclear weapons. It is not that we never have to say we are sorry, it is that in monopolizing the spread of nuclear weapons we have nothing to apologize for.
Comment on April 6, 2007 @ 6:53 pm
Will Fisher provides the best answer to his own comment – that Iran is run by irrational fundamentalists who will not hesitate to destroy on grounds of principle.
Last I heard, fundamentalists provide an important segment of the Republican “base”. Certainly, many concessions (and appointments) have been made to keep them on board. Are they rational in spite of the equation “fundamentalism = irrationality”? Or is Will Fisher really saying “Islam = irrationality”?
There was nothing particularly rational about the Cheney programme for invading Iraq – or rather nothing that has been admitted publicly. Nothing democratic either, if you define democracy as the expression of preferences in the light of full information. And nothing whatever “responsible” however you define it.
As for motivation, Iran sits between two nuclear powers, both heavily infected with fundamentalism. I see nothing irrational in a wish to have something to throw back. But I’d much rather not, as any rational person would. I do see great irrationality in a refusal even to consider a programme of regional de-nuclearisation as a start to dealing with the problem.
Anyone tempted to engage with Mr Fisher need do no more than read his letter a second time to see that he’s done the job pretty well all by himself.
Joe Roeber
Comment on April 9, 2007 @ 2:56 am
This AAAS report on RRW (April 2007) will be of interest to readers here.
http://www.eurekalert.org/images/release_graphics/pdf/aaas_RRWreport_0407.pdf
Comment on April 25, 2007 @ 2:46 am