I am not an Africa expert, and perhaps that is why I am confused about U.S. policy in Somalia. So I am using this blog to ask some honest questions, and I hope that our readers (or my fellow bloggers) will help me with some answers in the comments section.

Here’s what I understand to be the core events of 2006 in Somalia, from a U.S. perspective. First, the Islamic Courts movement, a group of fundamentalist Islamists, took over much of the country and started to establish a government, leaving the “transitional government” coalition of warlords in control only of only one major city, Baidoa. The areas controlled by the Islamic Courts enjoyed relative stability, but the Courts also imposed a relatively stringent version of Sharia and restricted Western influences (cigarettes, music) and some traditional Somali customs (chewing Khat) [for this background, see, for example, this New York Times article].

Americans don’t tend to like foreign governments that make such decisions, but the real U.S. policy beef with the Islamic Courts came down to their ties to al Qaeda. In the early years of the War on Terror, the U.S. feared that terrorists driven out of Afghanistan and Iraq would regroup in the chaos of Somalia (before the Islamic Courts took over); that did not seem to happen — perhaps because the terrorists preferred to keep fighting Americans on more central battlefields like Iraq. Nevertheless, some people (like Vance Serchuck at the American Enterprise Institute) seem to think that the Islamic Courts cooperated to a significant extent with al Qaeda, at a minimum “harboring” operatives; the maximal view of al Qaeda involvement (described, though not endorsed, by Niall Ferguson and attributed to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Fraser, here) seems to suggest that al Qaeda’s “East Africa Cell” “infiltrated” Islamist fighters into Somalia to begin with, perhaps leading to the Islamic Courts’ initial military success at taking over much of the country.

These ties apparently led to the second major event of 2006 in Somalia, from the U.S. perspective: some level of support (ranging from “tacit” to “logistical” in various accounts) for the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia that drove out the Islamic Courts and replaced their rule in Mogadishu (and other major cities) with the intermin government’s president. And to the most interesting choice, from my perspective: as Kenya sealed its border with Somalia to prevent the escape of the Islamic Courts fighters (at the request of the interim government and the Ethiopians), the U.S. used naval forces off the Somali coast to try to block Islamic Courts fighters’ escape by sea (see coverage in the Washington Post).

Of course, this strikes me as an extremely challenging mission, given the long Somali coastline and the number of small boats that must normally ply the waters there (for fishing and such). And I’m not sure how hard the U.S. is trying to really “seal” the coast.

But the choice to declare that policy at all seems remarkable to me. Of course U.S. forces generally do their best to chase al Qaeda operatives around the world — specific people who have done the U.S. harm or have tried to do the U.S. harm. But the Islamic Courts must have had many more supporters than the small number of people there who specifically have attacked the United States (or even our allies). Most people fighting in Somalia presumably cared most about stability in Somalia or, perhaps, Islam in Somalia. Somalia is apparently relatively homogeneous ethnically and religiously, but clan (and subclan) differences lead to a constant struggle for power there; some people seem to think that Islam might serve as a uniting and stabilizing force there. If the U.S. is now in the business of rounding people up solely because they supported an Islamic government, are we not substantially expanding the list of adversaries in the War on Terror? I’m certainly not inclined to think someone is an anti-American terrorist just because s/he prefers a form of government in her/his own country that I would not choose for the United States!

Somalia is an interesting country for the War on Terror. Al Qaeda has certainly had deep connections there in the past (apparently dating to the famous “Black Hawk Down” incident). And its chaos has offered something of a test for two widely believe theoried: 1) that “failed states are breeding grounds for anti-American terrorists; and 2) that “failed states offer hideouts and training grounds for anti-American terrorists.” It seems to me that Somalia provides some evidence against theory #1: as far as I know, very few al Qaeda fighters in Iraq or other terrorists around the world hail from Somalia; Somalis are busy fighting for their own future in their own country. And I am dubious of the second theory, but I don’t really know enough at this point to judge. What do we really know about the ties between al Qaeda and the Islamic Courts? And even if there were ties between the two, were those anti-American ties or ties aimed primarily at promoting Islamic rule over Islamic citizens — a frequent goal announced in al Qaeda rhetoric?

Now that the Islamic Courts have been bounced from power, al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has called for jihad against the Ethiopian “crusaders” in Somalia. But what was his view two months ago? I certainly don’t remember resounding calls from the jihadis to “regroup in Somalia to prepare a big fight against the Americans.” Did anyone else notice that directive?

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