Comments on: The Bipartisan Conventional Wisdom on Growing the Army http://blog.psaonline.org/2007/01/04/the-bipartisan-conventional-wisdom-on-growing-the-army/ Fri, 05 Mar 2010 21:29:47 -0800 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.1 hourly 1 By: Across the Aisle » Conditions for Increasing Active Duty Force http://blog.psaonline.org/2007/01/04/the-bipartisan-conventional-wisdom-on-growing-the-army/comment-page-1/#comment-25057 Across the Aisle » Conditions for Increasing Active Duty Force Tue, 30 Jan 2007 19:01:12 +0000 http://blog.psaonline.org/2007/01/04/the-bipartisan-conventional-wisdom-on-growing-the-army/#comment-25057 [...] Last week Across the Aisle blogger Christopher Preble had an excellent op ed in the Baltimore Sun.  Chris argued that despite the apparent bipartisan consensus on the need to increase the size of the military, if the overwhelming threat to the US is terrorism, this increase does little to counteract that threat.  Moreover, increasing the US military might actually lead us too quickly to turn to the military to solve our national security problems.  Chris also blogged about this recently here.  This argument is very appealing to me.  However, I’m also aware that many others feel strongly that the active duty military must be enlarged.  So, I took a look at their arguments.  My final conclusion is that this is not a black or white issue.  I tend to come out somewhere in the gray.  [...] [...] Last week Across the Aisle blogger Christopher Preble had an excellent op ed in the Baltimore Sun.  Chris argued that despite the apparent bipartisan consensus on the need to increase the size of the military, if the overwhelming threat to the US is terrorism, this increase does little to counteract that threat.  Moreover, increasing the US military might actually lead us too quickly to turn to the military to solve our national security problems.  Chris also blogged about this recently here.  This argument is very appealing to me.  However, I’m also aware that many others feel strongly that the active duty military must be enlarged.  So, I took a look at their arguments.  My final conclusion is that this is not a black or white issue.  I tend to come out somewhere in the gray.  [...]

]]> By: Gregory Scoblete http://blog.psaonline.org/2007/01/04/the-bipartisan-conventional-wisdom-on-growing-the-army/comment-page-1/#comment-24784 Gregory Scoblete Mon, 29 Jan 2007 20:54:22 +0000 http://blog.psaonline.org/2007/01/04/the-bipartisan-conventional-wisdom-on-growing-the-army/#comment-24784 So Pape writes: This “offshore balancing” approach kept our forces close enough that they could respond in the event of an emergency that posed a direct threat to U.S. vital interests. In order to effectively fight al-Qaeda, the United States should complete the transition toward a similar “offshore balancing” strategy by the end of the Bush presidency. Aren't the jihadists mad that the U.S. interferes in their affairs, period. It seems to me a policy of "off shore balancing" is just interventionism lite - we still take as a given that it is incumbent upon the U.S. to micromanage the affairs of the region to engineer outcomes to our liking. That policy failed spectacularly in the 1980s with Iran and Iraq - it gave Iraq chemical weapons, and Iran a strengthened desire for nuclear arms. It coddled the Saudis, who showed their gratitude by spreading Wahhabism throughout the globe. Why do you have faith it will work again? I think an even deeper reassessment of what our "interests" are in the Middle East is in order. So Pape writes:
This “offshore balancing” approach kept our forces close enough that they could respond in the event of an emergency that posed a direct threat to U.S. vital interests. In order to effectively fight al-Qaeda, the United States should complete the transition toward a similar “offshore balancing” strategy by the end of the Bush presidency.

Aren’t the jihadists mad that the U.S. interferes in their affairs, period. It seems to me a policy of “off shore balancing” is just interventionism lite – we still take as a given that it is incumbent upon the U.S. to micromanage the affairs of the region to engineer outcomes to our liking. That policy failed spectacularly in the 1980s with Iran and Iraq – it gave Iraq chemical weapons, and Iran a strengthened desire for nuclear arms. It coddled the Saudis, who showed their gratitude by spreading Wahhabism throughout the globe.

Why do you have faith it will work again?

I think an even deeper reassessment of what our “interests” are in the Middle East is in order.

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