In my last posting, on the day before the release of the Iraq Study Group I wrote that the report “will not offer anything useful.” I was wrong. The report, to my surprise, managed to be worse than not useful. It is, in fact, much worse than useless because, among other things, it offers false hope.

I’ll have more on that in a moment. First, let’s look at some of the more laughable assertions in the report.

Consider this assertion,” There are roughly 5,000 civilian contractors in the country.” (p. 12). A story in the Washington Post the day before the report’s release found that there are about 100,000 government contractors operating in Iraq, not counting subcontractors, according to the military’s first census of the growing population of civilians there. So they were off by a factor of 20.

And for a group that was supposed to be getting and studying all sorts of reality based ground truth they managed to avoid talking to certain essential groups.  It does make you wonder exactly what they have been doing since being appointed on March 15, 2006?

In a statement released on Dec. 8 Kurdistan Region President Masoud Barzani said, “The report contradicts the words of Mr. James Baker, who told us by phone that the special nature of the Kurdistan Region had been taken into consideration in the report. Although we communicated the Kurdistan Regional Government’s perspective to the commission in a letter before the report was released, the commission ignored the letter and did not read it.”  

In short, his comments can be taken as confirmation that the Kurds read the report and correctly understood it to mean get screwed. Given that the Kurds are the only reliable US allies in Iraq this not exactly an example of blue ribbon thinking at its finest.

Of course, some information in the report was undeniably fascinating, in a horrific way; like being unable to take your eyes off a car wreck. For example: (more…)

I had the great honor earlier today to participate in the White House Summit on Malaria, an inspired gathering of business, non-profit, and government leaders committed to ending malaria — a disease that kills a child every third seconds. I was excited to see the President, Mrs. Bush, Condi Rice, Paul Wolfowitz, and so many other leaders participating in the summit. It is clear that this administration is committed to ending malaria and the President talked today about a $1.2 billion initiative over five years to provide bed nets, and indoor spraying, and anti-malaria medicine in 15 African countries.

This is a step in the right direction for the Bush administration and our country. In the end, our country will not be judged on our wealth or power alone, but on how we used that wealth and power to better our world and to honor the sanctity of life. Given the myriad of foreign policy challenges that this country is facing, this is something of a slam dunk — it’s good for the world, good for the economy (since malaria is a $12 billion burden on Africa), and good for our security. Of course, as the discussion on this blog has shown, Bush is going to need some three-pointers to restore our image in the world and find an adequate exit strategy for Iraq. Regardless, I’m glad to see the President moving forward on other fronts to save lives.

All of that said, I still came away from today’s gathering wondering if the U.S. government really is doing enough? Wolfowitz reminded the audience today that 3,000 die every day from malaria — that’s a death tool the size of 9-11 every day. But if you look at our total expenditures as a country, $1.2 billion over five years is tiny. If this is a 9-11 every day, shouldn’t we be willing to commit more?

Fortunately, there is a wonderful network of private leaders complementing the U.S. government’s efforts and showing our conscience to the world through individual philanthropy. It’s called Malaria No More and it is an organization that I believe really will live up to its name. Check it out at  http://www.malarianomore.org/ .

Last Sunday’s Washington Post included a long opinion piece by David Rothkopf arguing that even if the U.S. pulls out of Iraq soon, we will inevitably return to fight “Gulf War III” in the near future. His implication was that withdrawal is futile, so we might as well stay. Of course, at the same time he was quite clear that “only the Iraqis can solve their political troubles and sectarian violence,” so continuing the American military occupation isn’t really about Iraq at all. According to Rothkop’s last paragraph, it’s about a lot of other stuff:

The United States must contain the complex threats it faces in the region…. Hezbollah and Hamas must know that the United States is present and stands ready to take action. Iran must know that it will not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons, period. Moderates in the region must know that we will stand by them, with economic aid and political support, helping to restore U.S. moral authority in the Middle East. And everyone must know that an attack against Israel will always be considered an attack against America.

How, exactly, continuing the occupation of Iraq would help the U.S. make these various points to regional actors, I’m not sure. And could any marginal increase in our ability to make those points to others in the region really be worth the sad, steady stream of American deaths in Iraq? It seems to me that whether we stay or go in Iraq needs fundamentally to consider whether staying in Iraq is likely to make the situation in Iraq better or worse — most importantly, whether staying in Iraq is going to help achieve American objectives in Iraq.

Iraq is a mess. Some Americans feel guilty and want to keep trying to fix it until it’s stable again. Our inability to stabilize Iraq offends our sense of ingenuity — our “can-do spirit” — and it seems hard to believe, given how good we (rightly) feel about the quality of our military forces and their hard work. All of this effort and capability should get a reward. But it can’t fix Iraq.

On this point, Rothkopf is right: the Iraqis have to fix Iraq. But what Rothkopf ignores is that the Iraqis are unlikely to do so until the U.S. leaves. Partly because they all have confidence in American largesse and ingenuity (the U.S. will fix it for us), and partly because the Iraqi leaders don’t realistically assess their own situation as long as the U.S. military is there to bail them out (or to blame for their weakness).

Most important, though, withdrawing U.S. military forces from Iraq would not only bring to a close the failed occupation (remembering that we really did achieve some good things by invading Iraq: Saddam had been a thorn in our side, and now he’s not in power, and we worried that Iraq would get WMD, and now we know that they won’t). But withdrawing American forces from Iraq would also serve America’s national interest more broadly. And that’s the best argument for withdrawal today: the U.S. should try to improve its situation for the future rather than only looking backward at the past.
(more…)

One of the important recommendations of the Iraq Study Group is that the US needs to begin engaging with countries such as Iran. The point is well taken that during the Cold War there were summits held between leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union.  There was even a direct line “hotline” between Washington and Moscow that was developed after the Cuban missile crisis.  How quaint this idea must seem in today’s environment. 

Some argue that of course we could talk with the Soviets.  They were at least reasonable and predictable- not fanatical like our enemies today.  I tend to not look at this time with such rose colored glasses.  Does anyone remember “Red Dawn“?  There was a general feeling that the Soviet Union was determined to spread its influence around the world… and yes, if you believe the makers of Red Dawn, even invade the US.  Despite  the consensus that these were dangerous people not to be trusted, we did talk to them. 

Now we find ourselves with different enemies.  Some say that regimes such as Iran can not be bargained with.  They are simply too fanatical.  This is ridiculous.  The Iranian regime, like all nation states, at the very base level is intent on self preservation. (more…)

Last week I had the pleasure of attending a fine conference hosted by The Stanley Foundation. I wish I could call attention to several of the presentations there, but I was particularly taken by Bruce Jentleson’s paper and discussion of the lessons that we should take away from Libya’s decision to dismantle its nascent nuclear weapons program.

Jentleson’s paper for Stanley (.pdf here) is derived from a longer article, written in conjunction with Christopher Whytock, that was published early this year in the prestigious journal International Security. His findings have direct relevance to some of the most pressing foreign policy challenges of the day. ”The key to the Libya success,” Jentleson explains:

was a strategy, started in the Clinton administration and continued in the Bush administration and pursued jointly with Britain and support from others, balancing carrots and sticks consistent with three criteria — proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility.

These findings fall into the category of inconvenient facts for those individuals determined to make the case that preventive war is a suitable — perhaps even preferable — form of U.S. engagement with the rest of the world. Better to be feared than loved, the logic goes. In this vein, the toppling of tinpot dictators such as Saddam Hussein was supposed to have a salutary impact, a demonstration effect, on the behavior of other tinpot dictators such as Muammar Qaddafi. If one believes, as the editors of The Weekly Standard apparently do, that violence and the threat of violence is all that matters in diplomacy (i.e. “coercive credibility”) then Qaddafi’s behavior is easily explained.

It has been a bit harder for the leading advocates of the Iraq war to explain the behavior of Kim Jong-Il, or, for that matter, the leaders in Iran. And with good reason. The response of the other two states of the “axis of evil” has been essentially 180 degrees from what U.S. policy sought to achieve: we wanted them to halt their weapons programs, instead they have accelerated them.

(more…)

I’ve spent the last nine months working for the Iraq Study Group, so I can’t offer neutral commentary on the report. In the midst of this blitz of reaction, commentary, positioning, and quick preparation of alternative reports, let me offer just a few initial thoughts that I hope don’t get lost in the shuffle:

1 – Read the “other” recommendations. The three core recommendations – shifting the primary mission of U.S. forces from combat to training and support; making support for the Iraqi government conditional on its making substantial progress toward milestones; and a new diplomatic offensive in the region – are at the center of the debate. But there are a multitude of other recommendations, many of which drew extremely broad support from people we talked to, and most of which need to be done urgently. Hamilton and Baker published an op-ed highlighting some of these other recommendations today. The New York Times had an editorial picking their favorites. I’ll be blogging about some of these in the weeks to come.

2 – Put aside those silver bullets. Too many prominent commentators have tied themselves to this silver bullet or that over the last few years. But there is no one thing that can be done in Iraq to right the situation. To take just one example, more troops (those that are available) aren’t going to stop Sunnis and Shiites from wanting to kill each other. Those who speak with bombast and clarity – who talk about the situation in Iraq like it was a football game to be won if some audible is called – are imposing a false order on to a situation with endless shades of gray.
3 – Look ahead. The ISG recommendations were not just made to address the current situation – they were made in anticipation of the dire consequences if things continue to deteriorate in Iraq. In other words, successful policy in Iraq may not make the situation “better” in a year or so – successful policy will keep the situation from getting that much worse. This is important – for instance – in looking at the diplomatic recommendations in the report. The problem is national reconciliation in Iraq. But it is also preventing wider suffering, terrorism, war, and sectarian violence across the region.

4 – You make policy in the Washington you live in, not the Washington you might hope to live in. President Bush is going to be President for the next two years. The Democrats will control Congress for the next two years. The American people are sour on the Iraq war, but they do not want to withdraw right away. If the President digs in behind some version of stay the course, he will be governing in extreme isolation. If the Democrats dig in to some version of an immediate withdrawal, they will miss an opportunity to constructively advance policy.

It is no longer contrarian to lambast those who seek bipartisan consensus or serve on commissions – indeed, the snarky takedown of bipartisanship is now even more predictable than the laudatory David Broder column. But the fact is we’re going to get nowhere on Iraq unless we can get behind some kind of consensus in this country. If it does nothing else, I hope the ISG Report provides an opportunity for people – like Gordon Smith – to come out of the trenches, to release their set of talking points on Iraq that they have been repeating like it was some kind of dogma, and to stop treating a rapidly deteriorating situation in Iraq like it is nothing more than an extension of American domestic politics.

“Confidence Building Measures” is a term more commonly associated with international conflict than U.S. domestic politics, but at the dawn of a new political era in Washington, DC both the Republican President and the new Democratic Congress would be wise to consider employing this age old tactic.
 
Such measures are needed because the level of distrust, and distain, between the two parties is at an all time high and frankly the country cannot afford two more years of political sparring….not when Iraq threatens to become the most damaging intervention in U.S. history and not when we also need to focus on a slate of other incredibly serious foreign policy issues.
 
So what can the Administration and Congress agree on during the first weeks of 2007 in order to build the trust needed to tackle the top tier crises of our time?
 
First, the President could announce that he will host a high level White House meeting on Darfur for key legislators and foreign policy experts from inside and outside government. Darfur is a bipartisan concern and the President would show leadership if he were to convene a group that would be able to map out a comprehensive U.S. global engagement plan on Darfur. Symbolically he could ask Rep. Payne (D-NJ) and Sen. Brownback (R-KS) to co-chair the working sessions.
 
Second, Congress should pass and the President should sign into law, legislation that would create a task force on AIDS and Global Poverty co-chaired by former President’s George H. W. Bush and William J. Clinton tasked with developing a road map for the U.S. to play a leadership role in ensuring that the Millennium Development Goals are attained by 2015.  
 
Third, our elected officials should create an Independent Bipartisan Commission on Interrogation. After two failed efforts to effectively tackle the issue of interrogation it is past time that a broad range of experts are brought together and tasked with the duty of holistically looking at this issue and subsequently offering Congress and the President clear guidance as to changes in the law that need to be made. The experts would be drawn from the intelligence, foreign policy, law enforcement, military, veterans, legal and human rights community. Additional members could include representatives of the faith community, theologians, cultural specialists and historians.
 
Will these three confidence building measures be easy to accomplish? Unfortunately, in an indictment of Washington, DC circa 2006 the answer is no. However, in contrast to the top tier challenges to come these three measures are more easily attainable and would set a tone of cooperation for the final two years of the President’s term in office.
 
The country is facing a cluster of significant foreign policy challenges and needs the Administration and the Congress to work together – first they need to remember how this is done. 
 

New leaders are soon to take over Congress and the Pentagon, a new course is urged for US policy in Iraq, and the President will soon select a new ambassador to the United Nations.  How will this all work as the US faces a new UN Secretary General?

The current SG Kofi Annan has served for ten years at the helm of the UN – and what a ride it has been for him and the world.  What do we know of Annan’s decade, and what does that suggest for what lies ahead?

A new book gives us an intimate view of those years.  James Traub, a contributor to The New York Times Magazine, has written a highly-readable history of the Secretary-General’s era, The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American Power. My colleagues Rick Barton and Karin von Hippel at CSIS, with Peter Gantz of Refugees International, hosted Traub this week, which included a lively discussion with many of us.

The book combines skepticism about the UN as an organization with vigorous reporting about the individuals who bring the institution and its ideals to life.  Some US names are familiar – Richard Holbrooke figures prominently, as do Senator Jesse Helms and Ambassador John Bolton. But he also profiles key personalities within the UN and those, both famous and not, who have worked to halt genocide, to argue for change, and to push for modernization of its creaky ways.   (more…)

Tomorrow is the day when the fabulous Baker boys, aka The Iraq Study Group, which is supposed to be the Bush administration analogue to the group of “wise men” who advised president Johnson during the Vietnam war, officially releases their long-awaited, if not terribly useful, report and recommendations. We should not be surprised that the report will not offer anything useful. Blue-ribbon panels are one of the oldest dodges in the book. And after all, the nine men and one woman on the panel are members in good standing Washington insiders who got picked for the job because of their don’t-rock-the-boat reputations. Who knows, someday, they might want to serve on another White House commission.

The recommendations will be available online at 11 a.m. tomorrow on the sites of four organizations tied to the group: the U.S. Institute of Peace; the Baker Institute for Public Policy at Rice University; the Center for Strategic and International Studies; and the Center for the Study of the Presidency.

Why do I write, “not terribly useful”? Because for America the war in Iraq is lost. In fact, it has been lost for quite some time. Don’t take my word for it. See what William Lind of the conservative Free Congress Foundation wrote. He starts off with this, “The war in Iraq is irredeemably lost. Neither we nor, at present, anyone else can create a new Iraqi state to replace the one our invasion destroyed.” (more…)

I read the news this morning of John Bolton’s departure from the U.N. with a great sense of relief. After a failed strategy toward Iraq, Iran, North Korea and a wide range of other security issues, the U.S. is finally learning that it needs to take a more diplomatic and collaborative approach to solving global security challenges. Slowly, even the Bush administration appears moving (i.e. being dragged) in this direction and may even come to the table to talk with Iran and Syria. Amidst all this, President Bush has continued singing the praises of John Bolton, who was accurately called by Senator Voinovich “the poster child of what someone in the diplomatic corps should not be.” Bush seemed either not to realize or to willfully ignore that American bullying and unilateralism at the U.N. would continue to undermine the America’s new emphasis on diplomacy in other contexts like Iraq.

Hopefully, Bolton’s departure can open a real conversation in this country about how we harness our unparalleled influence through coalitions to protect our security, rather than the Bolton-style unilateralism that has characterized our foreign policy for the last six years. The Stanley Foundation is holding a conference on precisely this topic in Washington this week to examine how the United States can best leverage its strength to develop a compelling vision for 21st-century leadership. (Click here to learn more about the Stanley Foundation conference.) Let’s hope this conference can create a vision that the next U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. can use to rebuild our image and strength in the world.