For a long time, President Bush used the same line on troop levels in Iraq: he sent exactly the number that his generals asked for. In the face of leading Democrats’ calls for more troops, generals at CENTCOM and in Iraq itself publicly indicated that they had all the troops that they could use — that the addition of more troops to Iraq would only precipitate more attacks on Americans and otherwise weaken the effort to get the Iraqi government to “stand up” its security forces. And at the time, that was tremendously convenient for the president.

Now, though, bipartisan support is mounting for reductions in the American presence in Iraq (e.g., at a minimum, the Iraq Study Group’s proposal to redeploy combat troops to neighboring countries) — and public opinion is falling into place behind a timetable for withdrawal. President Bush is looking for a “new plan” that will offer hope for the future, and as he has said over and over again, he does not intend to consider withdrawal as part of the new plan.

Unfortunately, the generals are now a political liability. Top generals on the Joint Chiefs of Staff — those responsible for the long-term future of the military rather than the day-to-day combat operations in Iraq — are starting to admit that the situation in Iraq poses a real threat to the military institution (its readiness, recruitment, etc.). But what the President really seems to want to do is “surge” more troops into the theater — troops that might temporarily stabilize the situation, at least until the insurgents adapt. But if a surge is what you want, suddenly the operational commanders’ statements that they have “the right number of troops” become a problem.

In passing, it’s worth noting that over time, the surge is likely to fail: insurgents will find new areas to attack, and they will recruit additional legions by arguing that the surge represents a clear commitment from the U.S. to an extended occupation; meanwhile, the surge of American troops will undercut the motivation and capabilities of the Iraqi security forces to act on their own, prolonging the “need” for the American deployment. The surge is not a strategy to end the conflict. It is a strategy (at best) to postpone the day of reckoning.

But in the short term, the big problem is the position in which the President is putting his military commanders. For good reasons, they want to be on the same page as the President: he is their commander in chief, and they want to do the best that they can to execute the policy that the President sets. If the President steadfastly wants to resist calls for increased troops, as he did until recently, then many operational commanders view their job as to explain how they can succeed within that constraint. In the classic definition of “objective control” of the military by civilian leaders — a definition that is drilled into our military leadership over and over during their careers from the time that they are first sworn in as officers — the job of top officers (especially operational commanders) is not to set the strategy but to execute it. Adherence to this definition avoids some of the traditional problems of civil-military relations (e.g., coups), but it reduces the combatant commanders’ ability to provide objective, high-quality military advice.

Moreover, commanders in the field have trouble offering objective advice: they are invested in their current mission, and they don’t have time and perspective for independent analysis of the situation. In a typical war, their career trajectory is inexorably tied to their ability to succeed in executing the current strategy (this war is atypical in that very few generals have been fired / paid a price for failure in the field — but they also know that they would pay a price for dissent).

Normally, the U.S. military relies on the Joint Chiefs (and their staff) to provide high-level military advice to the President. The Chiefs have the perspective, the experience, and the long-term institutional values to offer strategic advice. But at present, the President doesn’t like their answer. And he has the leverage to browbeat the generals in the field to flip-flop on their preferred troop levels. Now, General Casey (our commander in Iraq) is in the awkward position of backtracking on his view on troop levels. He now supports a surge (see coverage in the Los Angeles Times).

The American public should not believe him. Maybe a surge would be best, although I doubt it (see above). But I would feel better if independent military advisors called for it. And, by the way, even the Joint Chiefs in today’s environment are somewhat politicized — hand-picked by top political leaders, who know a good deal about the sort of advice the generals are likely to give before they do the picking. In the midst of the controversial fight in Iraq, it’s hard to find independent military advice.

Civilian defense intellectuals are not a good substitute. Civilian advice is certainly worse on operational matters than on strategy (because we know less about the operational situation, and our training is more suited to thinking about strategy than tactics and operations).

But when all voices are imperfect, maybe the only way we can get a decent result in the policy debate is to pay attention to as many voices as possible: civilians outside government, civilians in government, and the Joint Chiefs. We’re deep in a hole for strategic advice. And I say that with the deepest respect for the military, including its leadership.

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