Digging In
It’s safe to say that the ISG report did not make a favorable impression on David Isenberg. First, the specific assertions that were “laughable” - The “5,000 civilian contractors” reflect the number directly under the U.S. embassy. That is unclear as stated, though I don’t think it undermines the entire report. The ISG did meet extensively with Kurdish leaders. There are two recommendations that likely bother the Kurds - first, the call to delay the referendum on Kirkuk and have international mediation, and second the call to distribute future oil revenues on the basis of population. On the question of Kirkuk, the ISG heard from many sources and agreed that a referendum in the coming year would likely trigger substantial violence in and around Kirkuk between Sunni Arabs and Kurds, thus deepening and widening the sectarian strife in Iraq. On the question of oil revenues, plans to divide future revenues by region undermine the basis for a central government (since over 90% of government revenue comes from oil), and the economic place of Sunni Arabs within Iraq. In other words, the Kirkuk referendum and regionalized oil revenue distribution could plunge Iraq farther and faster into chaos, and destroy the viability of a unified Iraq. Sadly, that may happen. But the ISG did not think the U.S. should support that outcome.
On Iran and Syria, Isenberg seems to suggest that the difficulty of effectively engaging them means it is a useless recommendation. Well, is our current policy of isolating them proving to be particularly useful? What the ISG said is that all problems in the region are interconnected – you cannot solve them by talking to your friends but not your enemies; and you cannot solve them by talking about what you want to talk about but not what others want to talk about (eg. the Arab-Israeli dispute). And no, the ISG did not think that our friends had “already tried” to bring stability in Iraq. Too many have sat on the sidelines in important ways, particularly on national reconciliation.
On the “false hope” question, the word “victory” does not appear in the report. The ISG recommends a “responsible transition” out of Iraq. Isenberg wants the U.S. to “leave.” But it is not a simple thing to immediately move over 140,000 U.S. troops and an enormous civilian and military infrastructure out of a warzone in the middle of perhaps the most important region of the world to U.S. national security interests (never mind that President Bush would never do that, and he is in charge for two more years). So the ISG recommends a whole range of steps to take to give Iraqis the best possible chance of salvaging order from chaos, chiefly – stepped up training for Iraqi forces as U.S. combat brigades withdraw; pressure on the Iraqi leadership to make political decisions that can salvage their country; a strong and sustained U.S. push for more constructive regional engagement. This won’t guarantee an end to violence in Iraq. But it offers the U.S. a responsible course to protect its interests and give Iraqis a chance at a better future as we reduce our commitment to Iraq.
Finally, the 10 ISG members were not chosen to be the 10 greatest minds on Iraq in the country – they were 10 Americans from across the political spectrum who listened to scores of experts and drew on that expetise to build a consensus. Isenberg chastises James Baker for having experience in the Middle East, and then chastices Jordan, O’Connor, Meese and Panetta for not having experience. That’s beside the point. Ultimately, it is our political leaders who must forge consensus – not our experts (and I think you’d be hard pressed to find 10 experts who could agree on what to do in Iraq – just look at any op-ed page). What the ISG did is listen to every expert they could talk to, convey in clear terms what is going on Iraq, and give American political leaders a choice: come out of your trenches and forge a consensus, or dig in and have two years of more and more polarization and a deteriorating situation in Iraq. The choice is in their hands.
No related posts.
I think it is safe to say that Benjamin Rhodes took exception to what I wrote in my last post. Just to be clear on what I actually wrote let me addrress some of his points.
Here is what the report actually wrote about contractors:
Along with this military presence, the United States is building its largest embassy in
Baghdad. The current U.S. embassy in Baghdad totals about 1,000 U.S. government
employees. There are roughly 5,000 civilian contractors in the country. (P.12).
Note that they talked about the “country,” not contractors just working for the embassy.
Re Iran and Syria what I actually wrote was:
And then there is the call on outside powers, meaning especially Iran and Syria to help the US to immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive to building an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region. Been there, done that. The states that are going to try have largely already tried. While talking is generally a good idea, pinning a strategy on its probable success is reminiscent of the same reality divorced thinking that caused us to invade Iraq in the beginning.
Note that I did not write that the recommendation was useless though I’m willing to admit that I personally think it is pretty close to being so. What I did assert is that just calling on them to help is not going to do much? Without offering some specifics as to what is in it for them it is like urging them to cooperate in curing cancer or solving world hunger.
For the record I am in favor of talking with both countries as long as you are prepared to talk meaningfully and be prepared to give something to get something, as opposed to talking just to pretend that one actually believes in it.
On the false hope issue nowhere in my post did I use the word “victory.” I actually agree with the report where it states, “There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. However, there are actions that can be taken to improve the situation and protect American interests.” I just happen to think that the best action which can be taken at this point is to leave.
As for moving US troops out of Iraq the U.S. managed to move the bulk of its troops out of Iraq and Kuwait, in the aftermath of Desert Storm in 1991 in just a few months and back then the U.S. had over half a million troops in the theater.
As for not making recommendations because they will only be ignored by President Bush It thought the whole point of the ISG was to tell truth to the power. If the ISG is only going to make recommendations which are politically and ideologically palatable to the governing administration what was the point of doing it in the first place?
As for Jim Baker I did not chastise him for having experience in the Middle East. I wrote, “One can’t help but get the sense that this particular recommendation [ meaning the call on outside powers, meaning especially Iran and Syria to help the US to immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive to building an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region] must have been pushed by Jim “convener of the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference” Baker. And history shows us how well that worked out.”
If Jordan, O’Connor, Meese and Panetta had also been involved in that, which they were not, I would have included them also. For the recod I was not criticizng the latter for not having experience in the Middle East. I was criticizing them, with the possible exception fo Panetta who was at least in the military once upon a time, for being unfamiliar with and largely ignorant of every salient reality — geopolitical, political, social, cultural, and ideological — relevant to the U.S. in Iraq
I very much doubt that the ISG talked to “every expert they could talk to.” If they had they would have bothered getting some ground truth from American military personnel like, captains and majors. Instead the farthest down the chain of command they go with respect to officers was Lt. Col. (pp. 66 and 67). And forget about talking to a single enlisted man or woman.
Finally, if the ISG was not composed of real experts to begin with what was the point of even convening the group? We already have well over 3000 Americans killed in Iraq, over 20,000 American military wounded, and countless thousands of Iraqis killed and wounded. If that is not a reason for getting the best possible expertise, irrespective of who is hoping to pad out their CV with an impressive sounding title, then nothing is.
Comment on December 18, 2006 @ 2:15 pm
I don’t want to get into an endless tit for tat on this. The ISG report stands for itself. David holds strong opinions about the Iraq war that are certainly understandable – I’m sure he and I agree about many things. However, I do take issue with a tone that dismisses the seriousness of the endeavor. So, to go tit for tat one more time:
Yes, I agree, the 5,000 number was not put in its proper context. Fact-checked. But I think the Assessment holds up rather well.
The report does spell out what’s in it for Syria and Iran (pp 55-57). In particular, it is decidedly more optimistic about making progress with Syria than Iran for that very reason – notably, it is in Syria’s long-term interest to not have to rely on Iran as its most important strategic ally.
I don’t think that redeploying the U.S. military after Desert Storm from a friendly and clearly “liberated” Kuwait and defeated Iraq is at all analagous to redeploying our forces today from a country split apart at the seams – largely because of U.S. military action – with a significant al Qaeda presence.
I think it’s pretty clear from the Bush Administration’s initial response to the ISG Report that the ISG did not tailor its recommendations to suit the governing administration. That said, the purpose of the ISG was not merely to speak truth to power – it was to provide an assessment of the situation in Iraq and to put forward a comprehensive policy course for moving forward. In short, to reframe the debate on Iraq, and to provide an opening for a new consensus.
On the Madrid conference and its aftermath, I actually think it looks pretty good in the rear-view mirror, but that’s a whole other debate.
On Jordan, O’Connor, Meese and Panetta – I think there is an interesting discussion to be had about whether these kinds of bodies should be comprised of experts, or of prominent Americans from across the ideological spectrum. I do think David overstates their “ignorance” – they each brought a depth of familiarity with different aspects of the challenges in Iraq. I personally was inspired by their determination to tackle an inherently unsolvable problem, and to seek a consensus (part of, I think, the PSA mission). Ten academic experts on Iraq would not have forged such a consensus, and would not have had clout with the American people.
There was input at lower levels of the military, particularly at a staff level. And actually the view of these lower levels – the enlisted man and woman – is not at all what David espouses. Most surveys – formal and informal – show that the military does not want to immediately withdraw.
As for the padding the CV comment, I’m not sure who the reference is to. I don’t think Sandra Day O’Connor felt the need to pad her resume.
Comment on December 18, 2006 @ 3:00 pm
Well, I don’t want to go tit for tat either. On the other hand it was Benjamin who took issue to my post last week and my response to his comments. (Sir, you have insulted my honor!) So I will sally forth to joust just one more time and then retire from the field of battle.
For the record I don’t dismiss the seriousness of the endeavor; just the realism and practicality of its conclusions. And it is hardly the worst blue ribbon panel report in history. Anyone remember the 1984 Kissinger Commission Report on Central America for example?
Also, let me say I understand why Benjamin would want to defend the ISG. He has been the Special Assistant to President Lee H. Hamilton (as in ISG co-chair Hamilton) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars since June 2002.
And I should also mention that I thought Hamilton was a reasonably good choice; in fact, the best member of the whole group. When Hamilton was in the House he generally struck me as that rare member who brought intelligence, deliberation, thoughtfulness, and a non-polemical, non-ideological to the political discourse.
As for spelling out what is in it for Syria and Iran while the report may say why it thinks it is in their long-term interests (though actually it doesn’t do so on pp. 55-57, though they are mentioned on page 25 and in the section on the Iraq International Support Group) but it is noticeably silent on any short term inducements to get either states to actually change anything now.
For example, the Syrian leadership would likely lose a lot of credibility if they “flipped” without getting some very big returns. Assuming it can suddenly turn on a dime to accommodate U.S. preferences without offering some substantive inducements strikes me as, well, highly unlikely. Expecting either country to pull U.S bacon out of the fire out of the goodness of their hearts or even the appreciation of the possible long term benefits seems also unlikely
Of course, that is not to say the U.S. should not be talking with either country. Of course it should. But do it because you are really trying to accomplish something and not just as a public relations gimmick.
Re redeployment it will no doubt be difficult but not impossible. It will be all the more difficult if you don’t start planning for it now and start doing it soon. The alternative will be some famous future picture of the last American being evacuated from the roof of the U.S. embassy in the Green Zone. And if that is likely to happen how does one justify the daily increasing death toll of American soldiers and Iraqi civilians?
And if such an endeavor is complicated by the presence of Al-Qaeda (a somewhat debatable assertion as the bulk of the insurgency is composed of Iraqis of various stripes and not foreign A Q trained jihadists) whose fault is that? There was no significant Al Qaeda presence prior to the U.S. invasion. We caused it, we need to deal with it. Or put another way, it is Colin Powell’s Pottery Barn Rule.
Yes, the ISG did speak, in official blue ribbonese some things that the Bush administration would rather not hear. On the other hand it did not provide anything in its assessment that others hadn’t been saying equally well in the past. Just about any report by Anthony Cordesman over at CSIS, for example, has noted the misrepresentations and inaccuracies (what us common folk impolitely call lies) that the Bush administration has been putting forth since before and after it invaded Iraq.
Insofar as providing a comprehensive policy course for moving forward is concerned I think, as I originally posted, that the ISG simply fell short. Talking with neighboring states, talking tough to the Iraqi government, threatening to pull our troops out a bit sooner…. As Gertrude Stein supposedly said about Oakland, there’s no there there.
As for the experts and providing an “opening for a new consensus” what good is a consensus if the solutions aren’t practicable and realistic? Maybe ten academics wouldn’t have come to a consensus but I bet they wouldn’t have such ephemeral recommendations either. Sometimes dissent to a groupthink mentality is a good thing.
On the Madrid conference I would just point to the second intifadah and this year’s war in Lebanon and let people judge for themselves.
On the input from the lower levels of the military I would just say, as a former enlisted man myself, that I read the blogs from those serving in Iraq and it is pretty clear to me that the ISG didn’t.
Comment on December 18, 2006 @ 10:40 pm
[...] Ben Rhodes and David Isenberg have matched wits on the ISG Report (here, here, and here), and Brian Vogt has offered some great observations as well. This debate might seem tiresome, but there are over 140,000 American servicemen and women in Iraq, plus tens of thousands more serving in other capacities (including foreign service officers and contractors). We are spending $8 billion per month, and the costs in lives lost and disrupted cannot be measured. Iraq is the defining foreign policy challenge of our time. It hangs over every other policy that we might wish to see enacted or changed. We cannot escape this debate. It cries out for bipartisanship, the very principle on which PSA is founded, and it seems appropriate that we would engage the debate right here, even at the risk of overdoing it a bit. [...]
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