Some thoughts on the ISG Report
I’ve spent the last nine months working for the Iraq Study Group, so I can’t offer neutral commentary on the report. In the midst of this blitz of reaction, commentary, positioning, and quick preparation of alternative reports, let me offer just a few initial thoughts that I hope don’t get lost in the shuffle:
1 – Read the “other” recommendations. The three core recommendations – shifting the primary mission of U.S. forces from combat to training and support; making support for the Iraqi government conditional on its making substantial progress toward milestones; and a new diplomatic offensive in the region – are at the center of the debate. But there are a multitude of other recommendations, many of which drew extremely broad support from people we talked to, and most of which need to be done urgently. Hamilton and Baker published an op-ed highlighting some of these other recommendations today. The New York Times had an editorial picking their favorites. I’ll be blogging about some of these in the weeks to come.
2 – Put aside those silver bullets. Too many prominent commentators have tied themselves to this silver bullet or that over the last few years. But there is no one thing that can be done in Iraq to right the situation. To take just one example, more troops (those that are available) aren’t going to stop Sunnis and Shiites from wanting to kill each other. Those who speak with bombast and clarity – who talk about the situation in Iraq like it was a football game to be won if some audible is called – are imposing a false order on to a situation with endless shades of gray.
3 – Look ahead. The ISG recommendations were not just made to address the current situation – they were made in anticipation of the dire consequences if things continue to deteriorate in Iraq. In other words, successful policy in Iraq may not make the situation “better” in a year or so – successful policy will keep the situation from getting that much worse. This is important – for instance – in looking at the diplomatic recommendations in the report. The problem is national reconciliation in Iraq. But it is also preventing wider suffering, terrorism, war, and sectarian violence across the region.
4 – You make policy in the Washington you live in, not the Washington you might hope to live in. President Bush is going to be President for the next two years. The Democrats will control Congress for the next two years. The American people are sour on the Iraq war, but they do not want to withdraw right away. If the President digs in behind some version of stay the course, he will be governing in extreme isolation. If the Democrats dig in to some version of an immediate withdrawal, they will miss an opportunity to constructively advance policy.
It is no longer contrarian to lambast those who seek bipartisan consensus or serve on commissions – indeed, the snarky takedown of bipartisanship is now even more predictable than the laudatory David Broder column. But the fact is we’re going to get nowhere on Iraq unless we can get behind some kind of consensus in this country. If it does nothing else, I hope the ISG Report provides an opportunity for people – like Gordon Smith – to come out of the trenches, to release their set of talking points on Iraq that they have been repeating like it was some kind of dogma, and to stop treating a rapidly deteriorating situation in Iraq like it is nothing more than an extension of American domestic politics.
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[...] Ben Rhodes and David Isenberg have matched wits on the ISG Report (here, here, and here), and Brian Vogt has offered some great observations as well. This debate might seem tiresome, but there are over 140,000 American servicemen and women in Iraq, plus tens of thousands more serving in other capacities (including foreign service officers and contractors). We are spending $8 billion per month, and the costs in lives lost and disrupted cannot be measured. Iraq is the defining foreign policy challenge of our time. It hangs over every other policy that we might wish to see enacted or changed. We cannot escape this debate. It cries out for bipartisanship, the very principle on which PSA is founded, and it seems appropriate that we would engage the debate right here, even at the risk of overdoing it a bit. [...]
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