I’d like to go back to the lively discussion here about the Responsibility to Protect, and the ideas launched by Christopher Preble and Jordan Tama as a spin-off from the debate over UN reform, genocide and preventive intervention. 

Christopher is cautious about the idea of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), seeing its potential to undermine sovereignty by enabling bands of nations to circumvent the UN Security Council and eroding (further) its effectiveness in dampening down bad actors. He argues that this could encourage new nations to reassert their sovereignty by unfettered development of nuclear weapons. Sounds bad, and he raises a good point.  Jordan argues strongly that the benefits of the R2P norm are worth this risk of impinging on sovereignty, especially if it translates into a real means to stop bad actors from genocide and offers a route to deal with the Darfur-type situations more effectively. He suggests that legitimacy of action should be the test, a thoughtful approach.

Despite their differences, I’d guess that they both oppose misguided preventive wars and genocide.  Ok, so what is a way forward? There is no perfect answer, but two points may help. 

First, let’s recognize that military forces are already deployed today to protect civilians in horrific conflicts and that we’d better figure out what their jobs really are. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, four million reportedly have lost their lives since 1998, according to the International Rescue Committee. About 18,000 UN peacekeepers are now deployed there, some highly skilled with combat experience (and, of course, others not) and operating in regions such as Ituri in the East, where violence is especially high.  Their UN mandate, approved by the Security Council since 2000, directs them to use “all necessary means” and to “ensure the protection of civilians under imminent threat.” They do not have an R2P banner, perhaps, but they have a huge job on their hands to protect civilians in the face of a failed sovereign. 

How do those forces intervene to protect the civilian populations from violence now? Do they go after bad guys, escort humanitarian food supplies, disarm local militias, work with civilian police, or try to provide broad security? Or do they work on support to the local and national government, to build institutions that can provide its population the security it needs, and for elections?

Second, in debates over the R2P in principle, the argument usually stops after the “send in the troops” point.  Perhaps that is where the conversation should now turn:  Which troops to do what job? What are the mission’s goals and the concept of the operation?  Is the job to immediately stop marauding militia from attacking civilians or to bolster the government of the region to do its job?  What kinds of strategy, doctrine and training do the armed services have in this area? For forces trained either for war-fighting or prepared for traditional peacekeeping, this is new territory.

Certainly the US military could figure out how to carry out nearly any mission asked of it, but how would the political leadership describe the goal in terms that were clear? The US military, for example, is prepared for a multitude of operations. But like most militaries worldwide, few train specifically to deploy to protect civilians from large-scale violence in foreign lands.

Yes, the Security Council has failed to fully embrace R2P or to authorize a well-organized, capable military intervention into Darfur, Sudan that overrides the authority of the Government of Sudan. But if it did, the Council’s authorization would have to be really clear in crossing that sovereignty line – and then get to work on what the force is to actually do.  Today that real and urgent dilemma is puzzling military and civilian actors in the DRC – as well as in another half dozen operations – and deserves our dedicated attention as much as debates over future interventions. 

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