The psychological pressure would be the product of isolation if — and in fairness this looks like a pretty big “if” to me — the administration has been able to secure Russian and Chinese agreement on Un sanctions if Iran remains intransigent. There are elements in the Iranian government that would prefer to remain “isolated” from the United States for the rest of the century, but accepting with equanimity isolation from the hitherto sympathetic Chinese and the Russians as well is a more difficult proposition.

Politically, the prospect of reducing Iran’s economic isolation in return for giving up a uranium enrichment program that benefits few Iranians may be more attractive in Iran than we think. Iran is a petro-state, to be sure, but it is not Qatar or even Saudi Arabia — its population is too big for its needs and expectations to be met by oil revenues alone. Economic isolation from much of the world is politically acceptable to Iranians who believe it forced on their country by hostile powers led by Washington; as a choice by Iranian leaders determined to pursue nuclear weapons whether these help their people or not it may be less attractive.

This admittedly is an optimistic view of the current situation. It could be wrong on any number of points, particularly with respect to the Chinese and Russian attitude toward sanctions. It is surely no more sanguine than the view that an Iran with nuclear weapons is OK, because we will always stand ready to incinerate Tehran if an Iranian nuke goes off anywhere. Personally I would prefer we take what steps we can to avoid being put in this position, rather than accept it as an inevitability.

The New York Times’ David Sanger provides some background to President Bush’s thinking on Iran: President Bush reversed course on Wednesday because it was made clear to him — by his allies, by the Russians, by the Chinese, and eventually…