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	<title>Comments on: Preemptive Diplomacy</title>
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		<title>By: Across the Aisle &#187; Confusion at the UN: Is the US Trying to Win Reforms or Not?</title>
		<link>http://blog.psaonline.org/2006/05/26/preemptive-diplomacy/comment-page-1/#comment-58</link>
		<dc:creator>Across the Aisle &#187; Confusion at the UN: Is the US Trying to Win Reforms or Not?</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 03 Jun 2006 20:22:56 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>[...] Perhaps to help, Senator Lugar suggested his own list of 10 key areas. (Still a leader, as Chip Andreas points out.) Many important measures are already in the works.  [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Perhaps to help, Senator Lugar suggested his own list of 10 key areas. (Still a leader, as Chip Andreas points out.) Many important measures are already in the works.  [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Ridgway Center</title>
		<link>http://blog.psaonline.org/2006/05/26/preemptive-diplomacy/comment-page-1/#comment-44</link>
		<dc:creator>Ridgway Center</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 28 May 2006 16:55:20 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>World Policy Institute analyst &lt;a href=&quot;http://worldpolicy.org/wpi/hartung.html&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Willam Hartung&lt;/a&gt; advances a similar vector of commentary in &quot;Promoting Practical Alternatives to Preventive Force in the Wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom,&quot; a chapter in the forthcoming book, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.upress.pitt.edu/BookDetails.aspx?bookId=35835&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;Hitting First: Preventive Force in U.S. Security Strategy,&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt; edited by William W. Keller and Gordon R. Mitchell:

:&lt;blockquote&gt;[A] preventive approach to dealing with terrorism and other key threats to U.S. security will require a diversification of the foreign policy tool box beyond the current overemphasis on military solutions. Dealing with a distributed network like al-Qaida, which operates via cells in 60 or more countries and can sustain itself with or without state sponsorship, with a doctrine that emphasizes preventive military strikes against nation states, is misguided at best, if not actively counterproductive. It is the equivalent of trying to kill a swarm of disease-bearing mosquitoes with a sledge hammer, rather than taking comprehensive public health measures such as drying up pools of stagnant water that serve as breeding grounds, educating the public to seek early treatment if symptoms of disease arise, and so forth. The parallel approach for dealing with terrorism would entail a diversified plan that involves cooperating with allies on military, diplomatic, intelligence, economic, public relations, and law enforcement efforts to root out and delegitimize terrorist organizations. To the extent that unilateral or near-unilateral military efforts like the U.S. intervention in Iraq undermine the prospects for this kind of broad cooperation, that is another strike against them in the calculus of setting strategic priorities.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>World Policy Institute analyst <a href="http://worldpolicy.org/wpi/hartung.html" rel="nofollow">Willam Hartung</a> advances a similar vector of commentary in &#8220;Promoting Practical Alternatives to Preventive Force in the Wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom,&#8221; a chapter in the forthcoming book, <a href="http://www.upress.pitt.edu/BookDetails.aspx?bookId=35835" rel="nofollow"><i>Hitting First: Preventive Force in U.S. Security Strategy,</i></a> edited by William W. Keller and Gordon R. Mitchell:</p>
<p>:<br />
<blockquote>[A] preventive approach to dealing with terrorism and other key threats to U.S. security will require a diversification of the foreign policy tool box beyond the current overemphasis on military solutions. Dealing with a distributed network like al-Qaida, which operates via cells in 60 or more countries and can sustain itself with or without state sponsorship, with a doctrine that emphasizes preventive military strikes against nation states, is misguided at best, if not actively counterproductive. It is the equivalent of trying to kill a swarm of disease-bearing mosquitoes with a sledge hammer, rather than taking comprehensive public health measures such as drying up pools of stagnant water that serve as breeding grounds, educating the public to seek early treatment if symptoms of disease arise, and so forth. The parallel approach for dealing with terrorism would entail a diversified plan that involves cooperating with allies on military, diplomatic, intelligence, economic, public relations, and law enforcement efforts to root out and delegitimize terrorist organizations. To the extent that unilateral or near-unilateral military efforts like the U.S. intervention in Iraq undermine the prospects for this kind of broad cooperation, that is another strike against them in the calculus of setting strategic priorities.</p></blockquote>
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