Unilateralism, For Real This Time

by Christopher Preble | May 2nd, 2006 | |Subscribe

I was opposed to the Iraq War from the outset, but my opposition was never based on the president’s supposedly unilateral approach to removing Saddam Hussein from power. For one thing, multilateralism has its limits. Sometimes a nation has no choice but to act unilaterally, a point recognized by leaders on both sides of the political divide.

Even the unilateralism charge was a bit overdrawn. After all, while there was a tragicomic aspect of the Bush administration’s “Coalition of the Willing” (what kind of support did we expect to receive from Eritrea and Macedonia?), there was always one genuine military power, the United Kingdom, standing by our side. The British contribution to the war effort was obviously much smaller than the role played by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, but it was more than simply symbolic.

If the Bush administration were to learn anything from its mistakes in Iraq, it would ensure that the international community was solidly behind us before launching a military attack on Iran, if for no other reason than because we don’t want to be the only ones doing all the work.

But there was a more pessimistic view that anti-American sentiment was insurmountable, and that many countries would refuse to go along regardless of the details. Among those who assumed, for example, that the EU-3 negotiations would fail to reverse Iran’s nuclear program, and that France and Germany would again refuse to use force (as they had with respect to Iraq), there was probably also a sneaking suspicion that the UK would come through. By this logic, Tony Blair would pull yet another political rabbit out of the hat, rally his party and his country behind the effort, and therefore the United States would have at least one major European power solidly behind us.

Don’t count on it. If Blair pulls any rabbits out of hats in the next few weeks, it will be all about saving his own political skin, and the wider fortunes of the Labour Party.

Blair’s political problems first appeared in the Washington Post on Monday, but I happened to get an up-close glimpse of the developing story during a 5-day visit in England and Scotland last week. I arrived on what is now being referred to in the British press as “Black Wednesday” — a day in which three different scandals roiled the Blair government. By the time that I had left on Sunday, ominous comparisons were being made to John Major’s fall from power in 1992.

Most analysts expected Blair to step down as prime minister some time in the next few years, and that when he did he would hand over the reins of power to Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown. But if Blair is forced into a premature departure, it is highly unlikely that a more willing ally will emerge after he exits the stage. Indeed, Brown is more inclined to go along with his fellow Labourites in casting a skeptical eye at military action against Iran, and his ability to rally Tory support (which was crucial to Blair in the Iraq war) will be severely limited.   

All of which means a U.S. attack on Iran would be truly unilateral. And if we think we are having difficulty pacifying Iraq with a handful of allies (including the British) just imagine how tough the task will be when we are forced to go it alone.

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1 Comment »

  1. Brian Vogt wrote,

    You write an interesting post. I guess the reason that we haven’t been hearing much about multilateralism vis a vis an intervention in Iran is that we are still in the diplomacy stage. Though, with the saber rattling going on, I question whether or not we are following the correct diplomatic tact at this stage. I would find it hard to believe that even if Blair remains that he would be such a stalwart ally supporting Bush in Iran. I hope/believe that he has learned his lesson from Iraq.

    One of the things that you mention was the criticisms of Bush by many who said that he didn’t build a coalition. For me this is a criticism that works for those who both didn’t think that the war was right in the first place and also those who at the time felt that the war was right but that it wasn’t handled in the correct manner. I count myself in the first group. I feel, however, that I can justify the lack of a coalition criticism, with the understanding that the ability to build a coalition should influence our decision whether or not to take military action. If we can’t build the coalition, then perhaps we should seriously reexamine our decision to go in the first place.

    Comment on May 3, 2006 @ 1:35 pm

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